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Abstract 
 
Responding to disasters triggered by natural hazards is a deeply political process, but 
it is usually presented by practitioners, and sometimes even by scholars, as an 
apolitical endeavour. This is problematic, especially when the disaster unfolds in 
authoritarian low-intensity conflict (LIC) settings, which are marked by lower levels 
of physical violence but high levels of political and societal polarisation, structural 
and cultural violence, and humanitarianism–sovereignty tensions. Bringing together 
knowledge from disaster, humanitarian and conflict studies, this thesis confronts the 
uneasy relationship that disaster response actors  have with politics, and contributes 
to an improved understanding of the conflict–disaster nexus. It asks: 
 
When a disaster unfolds in authoritarian LIC settings, how do state, civil 
society and international humanitarian actors engage with the politics of 
disaster response, and with which implications?  
 
Existing disaster–conflict research tends to comprise either single case studies, or 
studies of a variety of contexts that group all  types of conflict together. This PhD 
study takes a middle-ground approach. It focuses on one specific type of conflict, 
authoritarian LIC, and analyses disaster response in three country contexts showing 
relevant commonalities: the 2016 drought response in Ethiopia, marked by protests 
and a State of Emergency; the 2015 response to cyclone Komen in Myanmar, 
characterised by explosive identity politics; and the 2016/2019 drought responses in 
Zimbabwe, in the context of deepening socio-economic and political crises. It draws 
on secondary sources and four months of qualitative fieldwork in each country, 
including formal exchanges with 271 actors engaged in organisations as diverse as 
community-based collectives, United Nations agencies and federal governments.  
 
For each of the three disaster response processes, the study identifies how 
resources, legitimacy and power were distributed across actors in the humanitarian 
arena, the challenges non-state disaster responders faced and the strategies they 
developed to overcome these challenges, with which ethical and practical 
implications. Yet, different core dynamics are highlighted in each case. The thesis 
thus presents the case of the Ethiopian humanitarian theatre, with disaster response 
actors wearing, dropping or even forgetting their ‘masks’; the case of non -state 
viii 
 
disaster responders socially navigating the sea of political, social and humanitarian 
transitions and tensions in Myanmar to get relief to ethnic and religious minorities; 
and the case of powerful actors strategically or routinely depoliticising disaster 
response in Zimbabwe, with less powerful actors rather coerced to do the same, and 
the least powerful—community members—bearing the impacts with their bodies 
and their minds. 
 
The thesis concludes that in authoritarian LIC settings, disaster responders engage 
with the politics of disaster in four major ways. First, the state instrumentalises  
disaster response to further political goals in the interests of a few. Power and 
violence are primarily exerted in ‘subtle’ ways, involving bureaucratic restrictions, a 
monopoly on and political influencing of data collection and analysis processes, and 
the instil ling of uncertainty and fear. Second, state and non-state disaster response 
actors fear the politics of disaster response, and are especially afraid of being framed 
as having ulterior political motives. They navigate a minefield of perceptions and 
accusations rather than a minefield of actual physical danger. This particularly 
applies to non-state actors. Third, it follows that non-state disaster response actors 
prefer to socially navigate around or conceal politically sensitive issues, rather than 
to openly confront them. The overwhelming majority self-censor in words, in actions 
and in ‘knowing’, i .e., reinterpreting their mandate or the humanitarian  principles. 
Fourth, there are indications that non-state actors tend to ‘internalise’ a 
depoliticised approach. Depoliticisation efforts do not always come across as being 
strategically reflected upon.  
 
Scholars have noted humanitarians’ increasingly varied engagement with politics, 
most notably with the emergence of human rights -based humanitarianism that 
displays defiance towards those causing suffering, and solidarity with the 
marginalised. The thesis nuances this observation, arguing instead that authoritarian 
LIC settings present a homogenisation of political engagements, at both a discursive 
and operational level. Even non-state disaster responders with more confrontational 
mandates and approaches employ self-censorship, for three main reasons: (i) to 
strategically safeguard cordial actor relations, acceptance and humanitarian access; 
(i i) because they feel coerced to do so, fearing physical or legal repercussions, or the 
loss of international funding; (i i i) because they routinely apply an overtly apolitical 
and technocratic disaster response paradigm.  
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This thesis identifies the potentially far-reaching implications of depoliticising 
disaster response, impacting people’s physical and psychological wel l-being, social 
cohesion within and beyond communities, state–aid–society relations, and the way 
in which humanitarian operations can be carried out in the future. Systematically 
depoliticising disaster response has profound ethical and practical implications; it 
ultimately constitutes another engagement with politics. For instance, when 
politically sensitive issues such as the marginalisation of certain minority groups in 
the disaster response are not talked of, they cannot be taken care of. While the thesis 
highlights how ostensibly depoliticised disaster practices carry the danger of 
reinforcing power imbalances, it also acknowledges that not all  actors have the 
mandate, or are able to take the risk of adopting more confrontational approaches, 
especially civil society actors. 
 
By way of recommendations for policy and practice, this thesis stresses the 
importance of strategic and diverse engagements with the politics of disaster 
response, and of a division of labour between civil  society and international 
humanitarian organisations. Donors have a crucial role to play in supporting this 
process, and disaster policy must refer to multiple conflict dynamics and multiple 
roles of the state. The thesis also reminds disaster scholars that the task of 
identifying and understanding power relations and processes of domination and 
marginalisation demands a constant and conscious effort, especially in authoritarian 
LIC settings. Conceptual tools such as the humanitarian arena, everyday politics and 
structural and cultural violence can open up the more ‘subtle’ and ‘system-
embedded’ mechanisms of repression and exclusion that permeate disaster 
response.  
 
 
Keywords: authoritarianism; conflict; disaster response; Ethiopia; governance; 
humanitarianism; Myanmar; politics; Zimbabwe.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Het bestrijden van door natuurlijke bedreigingen veroorzaakte rampen is een door 
en door politiek proces, hoewel professionals, en soms zelfs wetenschappers, het 
voorstellen als een apolitieke onderneming. Dit is problematisch, vooral wanneer de 
ramp zich voordoet in autoritaire settings met een laag-intensief conflict (low-
intensity conflict, of LIC). LIC situaties worden gekenmerkt door relatief weinig fysiek 
geweld, maar een hoge mate van politieke en maatschappelijke polarisatie, 
structureel en cultureel geweld, en spanningen op het gebied van humanitaire 
waarden en soevereiniteit. Dit proefschrift stoelt op en combineert  kennis over 
rampen, humanitaire hulp en conflict. Het gaat over de ongemakkelijke relatie die 
rampenbestrijders hebben met de politieke aspecten van het omgaan met rampen, 
en levert een bijdrage aan een beter begrip van de samenhang tussen conflict en 
rampen. De onderzoeksvraag is: 
 
Wanneer zich een ramp voordoet in een autoritaire LIC-situatie, hoe gaan 
de overheid, het maatschappelijk middenveld en internationale 
humanitaire hulpverleners dan om met de politiek van de respons, en wat 
zijn daarvan de implicaties?  
 
Onderzoek naar rampen en conflict omvat meestal afzonderlijke casestudy's of 
studies in uiteenlopende contexten waarin geen onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen 
verschillende soorten conflicten. In dit onderzoek is een middenweg gekozen. Het 
gaat over één specifiek type conflict: conflicten in autoritaire LIC-situaties. Daarbij 
l igt de focus op de respons op rampen in drie situaties die relevante overeenkomsten 
vertonen: de aanpak van de droogte in Ethiopië in 2016, waarbij sprake was van 
protesten en een noodtoestand; de reacti e op de cycloon Komen in Myanmar in 
2015, die gepaard ging met een explosieve identiteitspolitiek; en de aanpak van de 
droogte in Zimbabwe in 2016/2019, tegen de achtergrond van een verergerende 
sociaaleconomische en politieke crisis. Het onderzoek is geba seerd op secundaire 
bronnen en vier maanden kwalitatief veldonderzoek in elk van de drie landen. Er zijn 
271 actoren benaderd die werken in uiteenlopende organisaties zoals 
maatschappelijke organisaties, organisaties van de Verenigde Naties en federale 
regeringen.  
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In elk van de drie gevallen van rampenrespons is onderzocht hoe middelen, 
legitimiteit en macht waren verdeeld over de actoren in de humanitaire arena, met 
welke uitdagingen rampenbestrijders die niet tot de overheid behoorden te maken 
kregen, welke strategieën zij ontwikkelden om deze uitdagingen het hoofd te bieden, 
en welke ethische en praktische implicaties dit had. Elke casus heeft een eigen 
basisdynamiek. Het proefschrift beschrijft hoe rampenbestrijders op het Ethiopische 
humanitaire toneel hun 'maskers' dragen, afdoen of zelfs vergeten; hoe niet-
gouvernementele rampenbestrijders laveren tussen politieke, sociale en 
humanitaire overgangen en spanningen in Myanmar om noodhulp te bieden aan 
etnische en religieuze minderheden; en hoe machtige actoren strategisch of 
routinematig de rampenrespons in Zimbabwe depolitiseren, waarbij minder 
machtige actoren worden gedwongen om hetzelfde te doen, en de minst machtigen 
– de getroffen gemeenschappen – er de fysieke en mentale gevolgen van 
ondervinden. 
 
De conclusie van het proefschrift is dat er vier belangrijke manieren zijn waarop 
rampenbestrijders in autoritaire LIC-situaties met de politiek van een ramp omgaan. 
In de eerste plaats gebruikt de overheid de rampen respons voor politieke 
doeleinden die het belang van slechts een kleine groep mensen dienen. Macht en 
geweld worden vooral op 'subtiele' manieren aangewend, in de vorm van 
bureaucratische beperkingen, een monopolie op en politieke beïnvloeding van de 
verzameling en analyse van gegevens, en het zaaien van onzekerheid en angst. Ten 
tweede vrezen overheidsactoren en andere partijen die betrokken zijn bij de rampen 
respons de politiek. Ze zijn vooral bang om ervan verdacht te worden dat ze politieke 
bijbedoelingen hebben. Ze begeven zich in een mij nenveld van percepties en 
beschuldigingen in plaats van een mijnenveld van daadwerkelijk fysiek gevaar. Dit 
geldt vooral voor niet-gouvernementele actoren. Hieruit volgt het derde punt: niet-
gouvernementele rampenbestrijders geven er de voorkeur aan om pol itiek gevoelige 
kwesties te omzeilen of te verbergen, in plaats van ze in alle openheid tegemoet te 
treden. De overgrote meerderheid pleegt zelfcensuur in woorden, daden en 'weten', 
d.w.z. door hun mandaat of de humanitaire uitgangspunten te herinterpreter en. Ten 
vierde zijn er aanwijzingen dat niet-gouvernementele actoren een gedepolitiseerde 
aanpak internaliseren. Pogingen tot depolitisering komen niet altijd voort uit een 
bewuste strategie.  
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Wetenschappers stellen vast dat de politieke opstell ing van humanitaire 
hulpverleners steeds gevarieerder wordt. Zij wijzen vooral op de opkomst van een 
op mensenrechten gebaseerde humanitaire beweging die zich verzet tegen de 
veroorzakers van li jden en solidair is met de gemarginaliseerden. Deze constatering 
wordt in dit proefschrift genuanceerd, waarbij wordt betoogd dat de politieke 
opstell ing in autoritaire LIC-situaties homogener wordt, zowel op discursief als 
operationeel niveau. Zelfs niet-gouvernementele rampenbestrijders met een 
confronterender mandaat en een conflicterendere aanpak maken gebruik van 
zelfcensuur. Hiervoor zijn drie belangrijke redenen: (i) om goede betrekkingen met 
actoren, acceptatie en toegang tot humanitaire hulp op strategische wijze te 
waarborgen; (i i) uit angst voor fysieke of juridische repercussies of het verlies van 
internationale financiering; (i i i) omdat zij routinematig een openlijk apolitiek en 
technocratisch rampenbestrijdingsparadigma hanteren.  
 
In dit proefschrift worden de potentieel verstrekkende gevolgen van depolitisering 
van de rampen respons in kaart gebracht. Depolitisering heeft gevolgen voor het 
fysieke en psychische welbevinden van mensen, de sociale cohesie binnen en buiten 
gemeenschappen, de relaties tussen overheid, hulpverlening en samenleving, en de 
manier waarop humanitaire hulpacties in de toekomst kunnen worden uitgevoerd. 
Het systematisch depolitiseren van de rampen respons heeft ingrijpende ethische en 
praktische gevolgen. Het betekent uiteindelijk opnieuw een politieke opstell ing. Als 
er bijvoorbeeld niet wordt gesproken over politiek gevoelige kwesties zoals de 
marginalisering van bepaalde minderheidsgroepen in de rampenbestrijding, kunnen 
deze niet worden aangepakt. Hoewel het proefschrift wijst op het gevaar van 
versterking van het machtsevenwicht bij een ogenschijnlijk gedepolitiseerde rampen 
respons, wordt ook erkend dat niet alle actoren het mandaat hebben of het risico 
kunnen nemen om een confronterendere aanpak te kiezen. Dit geldt vooral voor 
actoren uit het maatschappelijk middenveld. 
 
Dit proefschrift bevat verschillende aanbevelingen voor beleid en praktijk. Daarin ligt 
de nadruk op het belang van een strategische en gevarieerde opstell ing in de politiek 
van de rampen respons, en van een taakverdeling tussen het maatschappelijk 
middenveld en de internationale humanitaire organisaties. Donoren spelen een 
cruciale rol in dit proces en in het rampenbestrijdingsbeleid moet rekening worden 
gehouden met de dynamiek van conflicten en de verschillende rollen van de 
overheid. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt ook dat het vaststellen en begrijpen van 
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machtsverhoudingen en processen van overheersing en marginalisering een 
constante en bewuste inspanning van wetenschappers vereist, vooral in autoritaire 
LIC-situaties. Begrippen als de humanitaire arena, alledaagse politiek en structureel 
en cultureel geweld kunnen worden gebruikt om de 'subtielere' en 'met het systeem 
verweven' mechanismen van onderdrukking en uitsluiting die in de rampen respons 
doorwerken open te breken.  
 
 
Trefwoorden: autoritaire praktijken, conflict, rampen respons, Ethiopië, governance, 
humanitaire waarden, Myanmar, politiek, Zimbabwe  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Should you want to interact with humanitarian practitioners in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, I recommend the Greek club on a Wednesday evening. Following one 
research participant’s advice, I was there myself at the start of my fieldwork one dry 
season night of 2017, and tell ing a more senior scholar about the research topic 
which had brought me to the first of three PhD case study countries. In 2016, 
Ethiopia had to cope with what was commonly referred to as the largest drought in 
half a century (UN 2017a), and with the most intense and deadly political protests 
under the current regime, followed in October 2016 by the declaration of a State of 
Emergency (Abbink 2016). How had the two processes of large-scale drought 
response and socio-political conflict influenced each other? An initial review of 
humanitarian documents and news reporting had yielded a very meagre harvest. I 
found close to no mention of the protests and State of Emergency, and only one 
reference to the week-long internet black-out enforced by the government, and how 
that had hampered communication around the drought response (Jeffrey 2016). My 
companion, himself well-established in Addis and affi l iated to a United States 
university, reacted quite dismissively: ‘Oh, but there’s not much to study on that. 
You know, drought response here in Ethiopia is a well -oiled machine where the 
logistics keep on running, protests or not. I doubt you’ll  find anything worthy of 
interest’.  
 
During the fieldwork which I conducted for this PhD study on the politics of disaster 
response in authoritarian low-intensity conflict settings, in Ethiopia, Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe, I learned to carefully phrase my interest in the sensitive issues of conflict, 
protest and state repression. Yet, when I did talk more openly, such a reaction was 
quite common for Western staff members established within larger humanitarian 
organisations. Little did those making the dismissive comments know: they actually 
did indicate that I was onto something interesting, namely the uneasy relationship 
that disaster response actors, sometimes even scholars, appear to have with conflict 
and with politics. 
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1.1 The background: Politics and disasters in conflict areas 
 
The largely technocratic nature of disaster studies has been challenged since the 
1970s, with the introduction of the ‘vulnerability paradigm’ (Blaikie et al. 1994; 
Hewitt 1983; O’Keefe, Westgate, and W isner 1976; Wisner et al. 2003). A disaster 
was increasingly viewed “in terms of the social and political nature of its causation 
and consequences” (Venugopal and Yasir 2017, 426), and disaster governance 
itself—the interplay of state, societal and humanitarian actors reducing or 
responding to disaster risks—as beset by politics. It is through political processes of 
inclusion and exclusion that disaster governance is shaped, resources are allocated, 
and certain issues and populations are prioriti sed over others (Hilhorst 2013a; Olson 
2000). Disasters result from human choices (Kelman 2020). Over and over, scholars 
have emphasised how disasters come about because societies themselves cannot 
cope with changes triggered by a natural hazard, thus leading to the disruption of 
the society’s functioning, and to human, material and other forms of harm. To some 
extent, this was reflected in policy making and practice. Humanitarian organisations 
paid increased attention to issues of socio-economic vulnerabilities, coping 
capacities, resil ience, and the nexus between humanitarian, development, and 
peace-building efforts (Hilhorst 2018b; Kuipers, Desportes, and Hordijk 2019; UN 
General Assembly 2016b).  
 
Yet—and just as repeatedly,  it seems—calls to  “‘re-root’ disaster studies in the 
political realm” (Peters, Holloway, and Peters 2019, 1) and to pay attention to macro- 
but also micro-political processes, have grown louder these recent years (Gaillard 
2019; Peters, Holloway, and Peters 2019; Siddiqi 2018; Venugopal and Yasir 2017). 
In 2000, Olson asked why it was “stil l  so difficult to gain sustained, systematic 
attention to the political aspects of disasters” (Olson 2000, 265). Some academics 
even pointed out that the field of practice had ‘moved backwards’ on this front 
(Gaillard 2019; Heijmans 2012). Gaillard (2019) thus noted how the vulnerability had 
become overtly technocratic, with non-Western approaches still silenced. He likened 
the vulnerability paradigm to an “anti -politics machine”, stating that  
 
in the vulnerability paradigm, the political agenda frequently has vanished. 
[…] The progressive political hollowing out of disaster studies has 
contributed to the ‘anti -politics machine’ that disaster risk reduction has 
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become (Ferguson, 1993). Technical fixes predominate because disasters 
continue to be seen as technocratic is sues, as they were 40 years ago. 
(Gaillard 2019, S15) 
 
A technocratic approach is particularly striking when applied for disasters unfolding 
in conflict settings (Peters, Holloway, and Peters 2019). In situations of conflict, the 
political causes and ramifications of a humanitarian crisis are rather obvious . Yet in 
those same settings, humanitarian actors responding to disasters triggered by 
natural hazards sti l l  largely view the disaster as ‘pure’ humanitarian problems 
requiring down-to-earth emergency operations only, as Zeccola (2011) observed for 
the tsunami response in 2004 in Aceh, Indonesia. It is notable that in the United 
Nations (UN) International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, known as the Sendai 
Framework (UNISDR 2015), which sets the policy tone at global level, there is no 
mention of conflict, nor social justice, nor marginalisation of certain groups.  
 
According to Siddiqi (2018), the blind spot for disaster politics in conflict areas is not 
a “benign oversight, but is in fact the politics of disasters in conflict areas”, and needs 
to be challenged (Siddiqi 2018, S161). Siddiqi ’s argument resonates with one 
explanation that Olson (2000, 266) had advanced for the absence of a well -
articulated politics of disasters: that disaster practitioners and policy makers have a 
negative understanding of what a politics of disasters would entail, and hold the 
normative view that such a politics ‘should not be’. This matters, because paradigms, 
i.e. the “convergence of a wide range of thinking upon a unified perspective”, are 
never neutral; the vulnerabi l ity paradigm itself, in its present ‘technocratic form’, 
says something about and produces the contemporary social order (Hewitt 1983, 4). 
In that regard, and taking inspiration from Hewitt (1983, 4), I ask: what is it that a 
technocratic disaster response paradigm aims to stifle in conflict settings? Why does 
it emerge, and how?  
 
1.2 The puzzle: An apolitical approach to disaster response in 
authoritarian low-intensity conflict settings? 
 
The disaster politics puzzle is particularly intriguing for disas ter response unfolding 
in authoritarian low-intensity conflict (LIC) settings. This is for four major reasons, 
relating to (i) the conflict–disaster nexus, (i i) the ‘subtle’ forms of violence exerted in 
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such settings, (i i i) the simultaneous saturation and hiding of pol itics in such settings, 
and (iv) the role of the state in disaster response. 
First, an improved understanding of political dynamics in authoritarian LIC settings 
contributes to the overall  understanding of the disaster–conflict nexus, and sheds 
l ight on a type of conflict which is prevalent, yet relatively under-studied (Demmers 
2012; HIIK 2019). Over the last decades, the frequency of disasters triggered by 
natural hazards has been steadily increasing, affecting a recor d number of 564.4 
mill ion people in 2016 (Guha-Sapir et al. 2017; International Federation of the Red 
Cross Red Crescent 2016b). This has placed disaster risk reduction and response high 
on the policy and research agenda (UNISDR 2013, 2015). One crucial factor, however, 
is not yet sufficiently covered in disaster policy making and research: societies 
themselves face increasing levels of change and instability, in terms of, for instance, 
urbanisation and population growth, but also conflict (Crutzen 2006; Skil l ington 
2015). Conflict is l ikely to have major consequences on societies’ ability to respond 
to disasters, weakening institutional response capacity (Wisner 2012) and hampering 
the provision of aid (Healy and Til ler 2014; Le Bil lon 2000). Of the worst disasters 
occurring in 1995–2004, 30% coincided with conflict (Spiegel et al. 2007), and most 
deaths caused by disasters occur in fragile or conflict-affected states (Peters 2017). 
Yet, an in-depth, nuanced understanding of processes taking place in the disaster –
conflict nexus is sti l l lacking (Hilhorst et al. 2019; E. King and Mutter 2014; Peters, 
Holloway, and Peters 2019; Siddiqi 2018). Policy and practice wise, the disaster–
conflict topic has only started to draw policy attention. The international community 
and humanitarian actors struggle to develop strategies aligned with the institutional 
complexities of conflict settings, as noted in a report by the INGO Médecins sans 
Frontières (MSF) (Healy and Til ler 2014).  
 
Settings such as Ethiopia, Myanmar and Zimbabwe do not immediately spring to 
mind when one thinks of conflict. The term rather evokes Yemen, Afghanistan and 
other war-torn places. Yet, LICs make up about 80% of conflict events, and are 
globally on the rise (HIIK 2019; Human Security Report Project 2016; Peace Research 
Institute of Oslo and Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019). In LIC settings, violence 
most readily expresses itself in other ways than direct physic al harm, although 
largely unpredictable riots, violent clashes, targeted attacks, widespread repression 
and kil l ings of and by state security forces do occur. Conflict think tanks traditionally 
set the minimum casualty number at 25 for a clash over government and/or territory 
19 
 
 
to be treated as conflict, and the threshold between low- and high-intensity conflict 
at 1,000 casualties (Human Security Report Project 2016; Pettersson, Högbladh, and 
Öberg 2019). They highlight that most LICs are intra -state, and triggered by 
incompatibilities regarding government (HIIK 2019; Pettersson, Högbladh, and 
Öberg 2019).1  Providing more nuance than simple casualty thresholds, scholars 
highlight accusatory rhetoric, discriminatory policies, l ingering threats and other  
forms of structural and cultural violence which fuel tensions within and across state 
and societal groups (Azar 1990; Demmers 2012; Galtung 1996).  
 
Second, as conceptualised in this thesis—and critically discussed in greater detail, 
including the more controversial historical origins of the term, in section 2.3—
studying LIC settings directs our attention towards more ‘subtle’ types of violence 
than armed combat, bombs and heavy artil lery. In doing so, it resonates with forms 
of violence which can be found across most societies, resulting in the marginalisation 
of parts of the population based on socio-economic status, race, religion or gender.   
 
Third, in authoritarian LIC settings, conflict and politics are a particularly awkward or 
even ‘taboo’ topic. As i l lustrated on Figure 1.1, on the one hand, authoritarian LIC 
settings are saturated with political tensions, contestation movements, state 
repression and structural and cultural violence towards particular groups (Azar 1990; 
Galtung 1996). The violence takes root in what Azar (1990) has termed ‘state–society 
disarticulation’. According to his definition, in  societies with protracted conflicts, the 
institutional state is dominated by a single communal group or coalition of a few 
groups which is perceived as unjust and unresponsive to the needs of other groups 
in society. On the other hand, in those same settings, state functioning is opaque 
(Debiel and Klein 2002), and politics are routinely backgrounded. A state whose 
legitimacy is already debated is not keen on additional domestic contestation nor 
international negative publicity, and wants to further assert its sovereignty (Ghani 
and Lockhart 2009). Authoritarian practices prevent open political debates from 
occurring and instil a climate of distrust and fear (Glasius 2018).  
 
                                                                 
1 According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) (2016, 31) the three 
major causes for LIC are (i) fights for a different ideological order, (ii) control of land and (iii) aspiring to 
state power. 
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Research has shown that disasters constitute accountability and agenda control 
crises for state authorities (Olson 2000), and political opportunities  for those who 
contest the state (Pelling and Dill  2006; van Arkel 2000; Venugopal and Yasir 2017). 
International humanitarian actors coming in to assist in the disaster response can 
furthermore be perceived as a threat, leading to sovereignty–humanitarianism 
tensions (Kahn and Cunningham 2013). Unsurprisingly, one might say, the coming 
together of all  these inherently political processes heightens the political stakes.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The saturation and hiding of politics as two sides of the same coin in authoritarian LIC settings. 
 
Fourth, focusing on settings where the state engages in violence and repression 
allows us to better understand the interactions between non-state disaster 
responders and ‘non-benevolent state actors’, which have been obscured for so long 
(Siddiqi 2018). While authoritarian practices consist of “patterns of action that 
sabotage accountability to people over whom a political actor exerts control, or their 
representatives, by means of secrecy, disinformation and disabling voice”, i l l iberal 
practices typical for LIC settings refer to “patterned and organized infringements of 
individual autonomy and dignity” and are l inked to human rights issues  (Glasius 
2018, 517). Yet, in protracted LIC setting opposing the state and parts of society, 
authoritarian and il liberal practices often go hand in hand; such long-term trends 
have also been observed in Ethiopia (Markakis 2011), Myanmar (Matelski 2016b), 
and Zimbabwe (McGregor 2013).  
 
Understanding humanitarianism–state interactions in settings where the state is 
engaged in violence and repression towards (parts of) its population is especially 
important as current disaster policy, including the Sendai Framework, identifies the 
state as the primary disaster response actor, and prime interlocutor for civil society 
Authoritarian LIC 
settings as saturated 
with violence and 
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Authoritarian LIC settings 
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violence and hidden 
politics
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and international humanitarian actors (Harvey 2013). The authors call ing for a 
stronger political lens assert that not only disaster responders’ capacities, but also 
their goodwill  must be critically assessed, including the goodwill  of the state (Siddiqi 
2018). Yet to this date, there have been few in-depth studies of disaster cases in 
which the state constitutes a ‘hazard’ for precarious communities (Carrigan 2015, 
121; del Valle and Healy 2013). 
1.3 The focus: Research rationale and research questions 
 
In this thesis, I wish to confront, with due academic grounding and nuance, the 
uneasy relationship that disaster response actors  have with politics. I aim to answer 
the following main research question:   
 
When a disaster unfolds in authoritarian LIC settings, how do state, civil  
society and international humanitarian actors engage with the politics of 
disaster response, and with which implications? 
 
In answering this  question, my PhD study brings together knowledge from disaster, 
humanitarian and conflict studies. It speaks to broader issues of humanitarian 
governance, in particular the tensions and implications of shaping disaster response 
as an apolitical multi -actor endeavour within mostly control -oriented and politically 
contested authoritarian LIC settings. 
 
In l ine with the above insights on the inherently political nature of disasters, I 
approach disaster response as a practice which “re-orders socio-ecological co-
ordinates and patterns” and “reconfigures uneven socio-ecological relations" for 
better or for worse, taking inspiration from Swyngedouw’s definition of a political 
act (2013, 7). While rather apolitical approaches might identify individual 
vulnerabilities as starting problems and the need to increase coping capacities as a 
solution, seemingly via win-win situations, analyses with a more political lens 
highlight the collective and contested dynamics of power and privilege through 
which disasters are co-created and addressed (Guggenheim 2014, 2). States and the 
social groups which contest them have long recogni sed the political stakes involved 
in disaster response, leading some actors to lose, and others to win. Exemplary or 
faulty involvement in the response can make or break reputations, and in turn 
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legitimacies and political support (Pelling and Dill, 2006; Venugopal and Yasir, 2017, 
p. 426). 
 
I advance that in authoritarian LIC settings, disaster response can be a conduit for 
violence, such as marginalising ethnic minorities. It can be a conduit to further a 
specific agenda, such as asserting state control. But potentially, disaster response 
can also be a conduit for resistance and solidarity. I draw on the concepts of 
humanitarian governance and the humanitarian arena (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010) to 
further highlight how disaster response is shaped through the interaction of state, 
societal and international humanitarian actors with various sources of power and 
interests. In these interactions, framing and everyday political processes (such as the 
granting or withholding of authorisations) are key. They determine the allocation of 
resources, and the legitimacy of aid providers and receivers, and thus re-shape 
power balances. Power balances may not only be re-shaped between more obvious 
parties to the conflict, such as the state and a grassroots organisation standing for 
minority rights, but also across and within the international humanitarian sphere 
(ranging from an INGO to a donor organisation) and civil society (ranging from local 
faith-based groups to more established NGOs receiving international funding).  
 
Yet, I take a step back to not only study the political disaster response processes 
unfolding in the authoritarian LIC–disaster nexus, but also the way in which disaster 
response actors engage with these political processes, and the implications of such 
an engagement. As i l lustrated in Figure 1.2, authoritarian LIC dynamics and disaster 
response can be approached in similar ways; both are intrinsically political, yet both 
can be approached as if they were not. There is a striking gap between scholars’ calls 
to treat disasters as inherently political processes, and the largely technocratic way 
in which disaster responders stil l  seem to view disasters in politically saturated 
authoritarian LIC settings. It is precisely this gap, its emergence, its mechanisms, its 
implications for people affected by disaster and conflict, that I wish to analyse in this 
PhD thesis. My interest in the implications of such engagement stems from Hewitt’s 
(1983, 4) discussion of paradigms and what they “aim to stifle”, but also from del 
Valle and Healy’s (2013, S188) warning that operational humanitarian choices have 
to be judged “against ethical principles and the overall  impact of an intervention”. 
Applied to humanitarian action, the humanitarian principles of independence, 
impartiality and neutrality are important to guide decisions. Yet, the core question is 
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whether these operational decisions and compromises help prevent and relieve the 
suffering of those impacted by disaster, as enshrined in the principle of humanity 
(Barnett 2013; Gordon and Donini 2015). On these questions, civil  society and 
community perspectives have been sorely lacking (Cunningham 2018; Siddiqi 2018). 
This is why I take the varied perspectives of civil  society and community members on 
board, in addition to those of international humanitarian actors ranging from 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to UN bodies.  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Authoritarian LIC settings and disaster response as saturated yet approached as ‘devoid’ of 
politics.  
 
My reasoning and data collection are further articulated via four sub-questions. They 
relate to each other as i l lustrated on Figure 1.3: 
 
1. What are the core tenets of the humanitarian arena in authoritarian LIC 
settings, in terms of distribution of resources, legitimacy and power? 
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2. Which challenges are disaster responders confronted with in authoritarian 
LIC settings, especially as l inked to political stakes? 
3. How do non-state disaster responders aim to overcome these challenges 
and navigate the (everyday) politics of disaster response in authoritarian LIC 
settings? 
4. What are the practical  and ethical implications of shaping disaster response 
in this way?   
 
 
Figure 1.3. Sub-questions and how they relate to each other.  
 
The reader will  note that no sub-question focuses on authoritarian and LIC dynamics 
per se. Beyond the humanitarian arena, LIC and authoritarian practices shape the 
even broader context within which humanitarian governance and disaster response 
unfold. Capturing all  LIC and authoritarian dynamics, i .e. conflict parties, violent acts 
and processes at play in a conflict area, is not an objective of this study. Still, 
acknowledging the social co-construction of environmental risks (Cannon and 
Müller-Mahn 2010; Renn 2008; Wisner et al. 2003) and disaster response as a 
broader-than-technocratic endeavour which stretches into all  phases of the disaster 
cycle (Blaikie et al. 1994; UNISDR 2007) ultimately makes for a wide fishing net even 
if one wants to focus on ‘disaster response’ only. Conflict and disaster drivers tend 
to blend with each other as both are the outcome of unequally distributed social 
vulnerabilities (Hilhorst 2013b, 2), and both are politically and socially mediated 
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(Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos 2004; Drury and Olson 1998; Pelling and Dill 2010; 
Werner 2013; Wisner et al. 2003). 
  
Moreover, it is important to situate and understand the studied phenomenon of 
disaster response in its historical, socio-economic and political context. Whenever 
possible, I endeavour to follow Said’s (2003, 6) advice: we can “speak about issues 
of injustice and suffering”, but we “need to do so always within a context that is 
amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality”. A balance is to be 
struck between detailed description of core disaster response processes, and of the 
broader currents within which they take place.  
 
1.4 Methodology: A small-N scenario-based approach to the 
disaster–conflict nexus 
 
As it aims to contribute to an improved understanding of disaster practitioners’ 
engagement with politics in authoritarian LIC settings, this PhD thesis is firmly 
grounded in a body of work scrutini sing disaster–conflict dynamics. It forms part of 
the ‘When Disaster Meets Conflict’ research programme which consists in a series of 
small-N scenario studies covering high-intensity, low-intensity and post-conflict 
settings (Hilhorst et al. 2019). 2 
 
The relatively shallow understanding of the disaster–conflict nexus is not to be linked 
back to a complete absence of academic attention for the topic, but to the nature of 
most existing disaster–conflict research produced over the last three decades 
(Peters, Holloway, and Peters 2019; Siddiqi 2018; van Voor st and Hilhorst 2017). One 
dominant strand of existing l iterature details single case studies, where the 
description of specific path dependencies and processes l imit theoretical 
understanding of broader institutional processes at play (e.g., Alwis, Hedman, and 
International Centre for Ethnic Studies 2009; Le Bil lon and Waizenegger 2007; Selth 
2008; Venugopal and Yasir 2017; Zeccola 2011). The other dominant strand of 
l iterature grounds its claims on large-N studies, which group together dozens of 
‘conflict’ country cases (e.g., Brancati 2007; Nel and Righarts 2008). This type of 
study has focused on establishing macro-level causal l inkages between disasters, 
                                                                 
2 Additional information is available at the website: https://www.iss.nl/en/research/research-
projects/when-disaster-meets-conflict. 
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peace and conflict, without in-depth understanding of processes, outcomes and 
implications for people’s l ives. Concerning both single case and large-N research, it 
can be stated that treating ‘conflict’ as an entirely context-specific or as an indistinct 
category is of l ittle help for either academics or practitioners (van Voorst and Hilhorst 
2017).  
 
This PhD study takes an intermediate approach, analysing three disaster response 
cases taking place in one specific type of conflict, one conflict ‘scenario’, drawing on 
the methodologies of scenario-building and small-N qualitative research. The small-
N case study approach aims to reach an “orderly, cumulative development of 
knowledge and theory” (George and Bennett 2005, 70). Drawing inspiration from the 
structured focused comparison approach (George and Bennett 2005, 67), the 
selected methodology combines the standardisation of (i) a common set of 
questions to identify contrasts and similarities across the case findings with (ii) 
sufficient flexibility to allow for country contextuali sation and increasingly focused 
country case designs on the basis of findings from the previous cases. The details, 
benefits and limitations of the chosen methodological approach are further 
discussed in chapter three. I aim to reach a deeper understanding of LIC–disaster 
response dynamics, while at the same time taking into account more than one 
country context.  
 
The scenario-building exercise is largely conceptual, and as such “concerned as much 
with creating usable ‘mental models’ as it is with reflecting reality” (Wood and 
Flinders 2014, 153). The aim is analytical generalisation concering core disaster 
processes in a specific type of conflict. In order to single out the core features which 
characterise authoritarian LIC settings , and to uncover which implications they have 
for disaster response, I gloss over complexity and diversity to some extent. As 
inspired by comparative work recently developed by urban scholars, I turn the 
‘comparative gesture’ on its head, seeking commonalities in processes and outcomes 
rather than aiming to identify differences (Robinson 2016). Imaginatively working 
with ideal-typical scenarios helps guide theoretical exploration along core disaster 
response dynamics, which emerge from one comparable case to the next. In several 
ways, the cases were thus analytically constructed (Ragin 1992). But scenario-based 
thinking and learning are also valued by practitioners, as found in a recent ‘Global 
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Learning Needs’ survey conducted with more than 100 humanitarian organisations 
by the Humanitarian Leadership Academy (van Voorst 2020). 
  
In this thesis, the three ‘comparable cases’ in question are the 2016 drought 
response in Ethiopia, the 2015 cyclone Komen response in Myanmar, and the 
2016/2019 drought responses in Zimbabwe. The three cases were selected for (i) 
their most similar context (Gerring 2016, 41) in terms of key conflict and 
authoritarian dynamics , but also because (i i) they promised, upon initial review of 
secondary sources and probing with country contacts, to yield interesting insights on 
the particular issues I wanted to follow up on, and because (i i i) fieldwork there was 
feasible.  
2016 Ethiopia, 2015 Myanmar and 2016/2019 Zimbabwe share crucial similarities, in 
particular the presence of authoritarian practices and LIC resting on deep-seated 
dissatisfaction with the regime in power (Beardsworth, Cheeseman, and Tinhu 2019; 
Farzana 2015; Markakis 2011; Matelski 2016b; S. Mpofu 2016). While structural and 
cultural violence towards certain groups is pervasive, deadly protests and repression 
(re-)occurred following a specific tri gger. In 2016 in Ethiopia, the trigger was the 
intention of having an integrated urban master plan of Addis Ababa encroaching on 
the surrounding Oromia Zone. In 2015 in Myanmar, it was the increasingly anti-
Muslim rhetoric following the 2012 deadly inter-communal violence in Rakhine and 
the passing of the discriminatory Race and Religion laws in 2015. In Zimbabwe, the 
increasing political rivalries and socio-economic decay led to protests in 2016 
(triggered by the cash crisis and corruption scandals) and in 2019 (following the 
tripling of fuel prices). Ethnic politics played a role in all  cases, with members of the 
Tigray (in Ethiopia), Bamar (in Myanmar) and Shona (in Zimbabwe) ethnic groups  
accused of imposing their hegemony on other religious, ethnic and/or socio-
economic minorities.    
 
While all  cases were impacted by a disaster necessitating the interplay of state, civil  
society organisations (CSOs) and international humanitarian actors, the type of 
disaster (slow vs. quick onset) and many country-context aspects widely differed. 
This is not necessarily a drawback; when “common causes or social processes can be 
found in spite of these contrasts”, even stronger theories can be built on the findings 
(Höglund and Öberg 2011, 117).  
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Four months of fieldwork were conducted in each country. I engaged with research 
participants based on the interpretive assumption that there are “multiple perceived 
and/or experienced social ‘realities’ concerning what happened, rather than a 
singular ‘truth’” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 4). Especially in authoritarian LIC 
settings, perspectives will  greatly vary depending on participants’ positionality. In 
this thesis, I adopt a constructive form of interpretivism, and take an actor-oriented 
approach whereby actors “construct the social world, both through their 
interpretations of it and through the actions based on those interpretations” 
(Hammersley 2002, 67).  
 
I follow an iterative sense-making process, basing my reasoning on field 
observations, but also engaging in a “continuous juxtaposition of conceptual 
formulations with field realities”, balancing phases of data generation and analysis, 
getting puzzled by gaps between what I observe, hear and read (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow 2012, 56). As I will  succinctly explain in the last sub-section of this 
introduction, this iterative research process took place at various research stages: 
prior to the first case study based on a review on existing l iterature, during fieldwork 
itself, during bigger ‘analysis and design pauses’ between country case fieldwork 
involving renewed rounds of l iterature review, analysis and discussions with the 
research programme team, and in a final analysis phase building on the findings of 
all  three cases. 
 
1.5 Three country case studies and what to expect from this 
thesis 
 
This PhD thesis is divided into eight chapters: one introduction, one chapter each for 
laying out the theoretical and the methodological groundwork, three empirical 
country cases, one empirical chapter tying ins ights from all  three cases together into 
the ‘LIC scenario findings’, and the conclusions. As chapter seven in effect answers 
the sub-questions, the thesis conclusions in chapter eight provide an answer to my 
main research question, as well as reflections on theoretical and societal implications 
of my findings, l imitations of my study, and areas for future research. In each 
empirical country chapter, I deepen my understanding of the LIC–disaster nexus by 
engaging with country-specific research gaps and increasingly focused theoretical 
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and societal debates, and by bringing in new conceptual tools. Case-specific context 
and methodology are also presented in each country chapter.  
 
Here, I wish to sketch the overall  progress across and beyond the three cases. 
Selecting, designing, analysing and writing up my empirical case findings, I aimed to 
give growing substance to the core dynamics of the disaster-struck LIC scenario from 
one country case to the next. Figure 1.4 i l lustrates the theoretical concepts which 
were brought in for each empirical country case: the concept of ‘the humanitarian 
theatre’ for the Ethiopian case, of ‘social navigation’ for Myanmar, and of 
‘depoliticisation and its implications’ for Zimbabwe.  
 
 
Figure 1.4. Deepening my understanding of core processes in the disaster–LIC nexus.  
 
First in Ethiopia, the case of the response to the worst drought in 50 years 
overlapping in 2016 with widespread deadly protests followed by the declaration of 
a State of Emergency laid the groundwork to make sense of key institutions, 
discourses, practices and ‘friction points’ between actors responding to a disaster in 
authoritarian LIC settings. But the Ethiopian case, and Goffman’s (1959) distinction 
between frontstage and backstage behaviour, facil itated an understanding of how 
state, civil  society and international humanitarian actors play their parts on the 
frontstage of the humanitarian theatre, as apolitical actors seemingly unaware of 
authoritarian and LIC dynamics and power imbalances. In Ethiopia, where conflict 
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and politics are routinely backgrounded, the way in which actors involved in disaster 
response framed other disaster responders, LIC and drought impacts formed my 
primary focus. I examined how disaster response actors shaped frontstage artefacts 
such as Humanitarian Requirement Documents and drought hotspot classification 
maps. Furthermore, I described how disaster responders’ ‘masks ’ were worn, 
forgotten or laid aside during multi -actor meetings, informal humanitarian 
gatherings, but also during exchanges with myself as a researcher. This allowed me 
to confront broader questions on the implications of LIC and a restricted civil  society 
space on the humanitarian space, and how actors frame and enact humanitarian 
principles.  
 
Second, based on this improved understanding of disaster –LIC dynamics and 
challenges, I wondered how non-state actors could operate notwithstanding the 
many restrictions imposed on them in authoritarian LIC settings. The Myanmar case 
study therefore was more focused on humanitarian operations. In this second case 
study, I aimed to capture the strategies which non-state disaster responders develop 
to reach a politically sensitive goal within a restricted and uncertain space for 
manoeuvre. This meant exploring how, following the 2015 cyclone Komen, civil  
society and international actors strived to get relief to ethnic and religious minorities 
whose marginalisation is contested in Myanmar generally, and during the cyclone 
response in particular. This second time, I specifically detailed how actors navigate 
around obstacles to reach minorities, all  while keeping the physical integrity of their 
staff and the reputation of their organisation intact. To do so, I relied on the concept 
of ‘social navigation’. This refers to how actors, often those with a lesser power  
position, “disentangle themselves from confining structures, plot their escape and 
move towards better posi tions”, all within an environment which is itself constantly 
evolving (Vigh 2009, 419).  
 
Third, in Zimbabwe, I focused on the implications of shaping disaster response in a 
specific way. Myanmar research participants had relayed the many dilemmas they 
confronted when navigating authoritarian LIC obstacles. Important compromises 
were involved, and I wished to consider these compromises “against ethical 
principles and the overall  impact of the [humanitarian] intervention”, following del 
Valle and Healy (2013, S188). In Zimbabwe, ethical and practical implications of 
shaping disaster response as seemingly fit for authoritarian LIC settings thus formed 
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my primary l ine of inquiry. Again, the major tenets of the broader humanitarian 
governance system, challenges and strategies were captured, but this time from the 
conceptual angle of depoliticisation (Beveridge 2017; Flinders and Buller 2006; 
Mouffe 1995; Swyngedouw 2013; Wood and Flinders 2014). The drought-ridden 
Zimbabwe of 2016–2019 presented the specific puzzle of a politically saturated 
context, with very tense actor relations and a plethora of notoriously inflammable 
subjects, including politically biased food aid distribution. Within such a context, the 
manner in which actors ostensibly depoliticised their very identity, motivations and 
actions was particularly salient. So were the implications of disaster responders’ 
depoliticisation choices. In a methodological sense, data collection was more 
grounded in disaster victims’ realities, including their ind ividual private spheres, than 
in the previous two cases. In Zimbabwe, it is one specific drought-affected 
community, with its internal nuances, which captured my attention.  
 
Each empirical country chapter thus covered all  four research sub-questions, yet 
with shifting weight and focus. In this first phase of analysis, I coaxed out the 
uniqueness of each individual case, even though the shaping and analysis of case two 
and case three were also influenced by past case findings. In a second analytical 
phase, and at a higher level of abstraction, the different country contexts were 
brought “together and into the same analytical frame”, allowing me to “think with 
insights from elsewhere” (Robinson 2016, 193–194). At this second stage, with 
findings presented in chapter seven, I aimed to bring all three cases into conversation 
with each other (Jacobs 2012). I sought contrasts and similarities between them to 
advance the conceptuali sation of disaster–conflict dynamics in authoritarian LIC 
areas.  
 
All  four empirical  chapters derive from academic articles which have either been 
published, or accepted for publication, or are under review with journals: 
 Chapter four on Ethiopia is a minor revision of an article published by the 
Journal of Modern African Studies, together with Ethiopian research partner 
Hone Mandefro and thesis supervisor Dorothea Hilhorst (Desportes, 
Mandefro, and Hilhorst 2019).  
 Chapter five on Myanmar is a minor revision of an article published by the 
Journal of International Humanitarian Action (Desportes 2019c).  
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 Chapter six on Zimbabwe is a minor revision of an article under review by 
the journal  Disasters, submitted together with Zimbabwean research 
partner Ntombizakhe Moyo-Nyoni.  
 Chapter seven, tying together insights from Ethiopia, Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe, consists of an extended version of an article accepted for 
publication in Politics and Governance, together with thesis supervisor 
Dorothea Hilhorst. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations 
 
Temporarily under embargo. 
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Chapter 3: Methodological and Ethical Considerations 
 
Temporarily under embargo. 
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Chapter 4: The Humanitarian Theatre: Drought response 
during Ethiopia’s low-intensity conflict of 20163 
 
Abstract 
This chapter details the case of Ethiopia in 2016, when a 50-year drought coincided 
with a wave of protests and a State of Emergency. During four months of qualitative 
fieldwork in 2017, state, civil  society, and international  humanitarian actors were 
approached—from humanitarian headquarters to communities in the Amhara, 
Oromiya and Somali  regions. Research participants conveyed stark discrepancies 
between the humanitarian theatre’s  ‘frontstage’, where disaster response actors 
showcase an exemplary response, and its ‘backstage’, where they remove their 
frontstage masks, reflect and (in l imited cases) act on the information and decision-
making monopoly of the state and the invasion of conflict dynamics into the 
humanitarian response. In humanitarian research and in policy, a collective 
conversation is necessary on where to draw the line between respect for 
governments’ sovereignty and the intrusion of humanitarian principles. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Key locations in Ethiopia (Author 2020 based on Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development Geoportal 2014). 
                                                                 
3 This chapter is a minor revision of the published article: Desportes, Mandefro and Hilhorst (2019).  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Ethiopia used to be a textbook case of the intermingling of politics and (international) 
humanitarianism. Drought response examples from the 1970s and 1980s, involving 
forced displacements or the downfall  of regimes, abound. De Waal (2018, 140) 
characterised the drought of 1984 a “second-degree famine crime”, as the 
controlling Dergue military regime “created and sustained the famine as part of its 
counter-insurgency”. De Waal detailed how the Ethiopian army looted vil lages and 
livestock, blocked roads and bombed markets, and requisitioned World Food 
Programme supplies to feed the militia. In multiple regions, international  aid was 
instrumentalised to lure the population into ‘protected’ vil lages (Hagmann and Korf 
2012).  
 
However, analyses of the politics of foreign aid flows are thinner regarding 
humanitarian issues concerning Ethiopian nationals, the less peripheral  regions of 
the country and more recent events. A few exceptions are human rights reports 
(Human Rights Watch 2010) and academic l iterature focusing on the politics of 
development issues (Bishop and Hilhorst 2010; Cochrane and Tamiru 2016), refugee 
care (Corbet et al. 2017) or the more openly conflict-ridden Somali  region (Binet 
2011; Carruth 2016; Hagmann and Korf 2012).  
 
This chapter aims to rekindle the debate on the politics of humanitarianism in 
contemporary Ethiopia, in both practice-oriented and scholarly circles. Relief in 
Ethiopia is mainly geared towards disasters triggered by natural  hazards. The country 
experienced major flooding in 2006 and droughts in 2002–2003, 2011 and 2015–
2017. In 2016, 10.2 mill ion people required international  assistance (UN 2017b). 
Responding to disasters is the remit of national  government, with international  
humanitarian agencies playing an auxiliary role. Together, they face the resource 
shortages and logistical difficulties associated with supporting mill ions of food-
insecure people across various agro-ecological zones within an overstressed and 
competitive global  humanitarian landscape. Efforts to address these challenges have 
involved improved disaster risk profiling, early warning systems, drought-resistant 
farming practices and smoother aid procurement chains and cross-sectoral 
collaboration. The technocratic language of these interventions may give the 
impression that they are implemented in “ahistorical, apolitical and tabula rasa 
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environments”, as Cochrane and Tamiru (2016, 652) observed for Ethiopian 
development programmes. In reality, power relations, questions of legitimacy and 
authority games always play a role, although this is less obvious than in the previous 
century. Today, the political is increasingly hidden in the mundane routines of 
everyday practice of relief programmes (Hilhorst 2013a; Kerkvliet 2009, 232) but can 
nonetheless have major implications for disaster-affected populations. 
 
This is particularly true during accelerated political turmoil, as occurred in 2016 in 
Ethiopia, when the response to the worst drought in half a century (De Waal 2018, 
136) coincided with a violent protest phase, the extrajudicial jailing of tens of 
thousands and the kil l ing of hundreds, followed by the declaration of a State of 
Emergency in October 2016 (Abbink 2016; Amnesty International  2017). Focusing on 
a year of both hydro-meteorological  and socio-political stress provides a much-
needed reflection on the dynamics through which humanitarian response and 
political conflict interact (E. King and Mutter 2014). Moreover, although most 
conflict-related literature focuses on high-intensity conflicts, it is important to 
explore the much more frequently observed LICs (HIIK 2016; Human Security Report 
Project 2016), such as the 2015–2016 turmoil  in Ethiopia. 
 
This political turmoil  occurred in the larger context of a restricted space for civil  
society, the implications of which are only starting to be problematised in the 
development and human rights l iterature (Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016). Possible 
repercussions for humanitarian response in terms of how organisations frame and 
enact humanitarian principles are stil l largely unknown. The study of the everyday 
politics of aid in Ethiopia, with its strong if not authoritarian government, is 
particularly interesting in l ight of the current global  resurgence of state sovereignty 
affirmations (Cooley 2015), which result in a widening gap with the concurrently 
evolving understanding of international  humanitarian mandates (Kahn and 
Cunningham 2013). 
  
Keeping these broader implications in mind, this chapter examines how the relations 
between aid, state and societal  actors affected the response to the 2016 drought in 
Ethiopia and which strategies actors developed to support disaster victims, given the 
context of protests and the declaration of a State of Emergency. While its main focus 
is on the providers of aid, including Ethiopian non-governmental  organisations 
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(ENGOs), the chapter also draws on insights of community members about these 
processes. A major finding of this case study is how role-playing and discursive games 
influenced the opening and closing of the humanitarian space where disaster 
response took place. To analyse our findings, we draw on Erving Goffman’s  (1959) 
distinction between ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ behaviour. We begin by presenting 
the theoretical  and methodological  foundations of our analysis and describing the 
Ethiopian context. 
 
4.2 Disasters in times of political turmoil 
 
As O’Keefe et al. (1976) and many others (Blaikie et al. 1994; Cannon and Müller-
Mahn 2010; Füssel 2007) have argued, disasters are not external natural  events; 
rather, they are societally endogenous political processes. Who will  be the most 
vulnerable to a natural  hazard is socially shaped, as is who benefits from disaster 
response. Outcomes depend on who has the power to define and give meaning to 
the disaster event, to decide on pre- and post-disaster policy and effects, and to 
determine which resources will  be allocated to which recovery and reconstruction 
efforts (Olson 2000). 
 
The concept of the humanitarian arena (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010) provides a lens 
through which to capture these dynamics, asserting that aid is shaped by ‘aid–society 
relations’ in the sense that the actors along multiple aid chains, from “donor  
representatives, headquarters, state agents, local  institutions, aid workers, [and] aid 
recipients […] [to] surrounding actors”, are intrinsically embedded in the society 
where they operate (Hilhorst 2016, 5). As Hilhorst (2016) further stresses, aid actors 
do not form a separate layer, but rather add to the complexity of governance, which 
is made up of government and a range of societal  actors. All  these actors are subject 
to multi-level power relations, with aid practices and their results remaining the 
outcome of “the messy interaction of social  actors struggling, negotiating and at 
times guessing to further their own interests” (Bakewell  2000, 108–109).  
 
As major disruptive events, disasters are l ikely to serve as catalysts, cracking open 
tensions looming close to the surface (Hutchison 2014). Drury and Olson (1998) and 
Pelling and Dill  (2010, 34) highlighted the porosity of the conflict–disaster nexus, 
asserting that “disaster shocks open political  space for the contestation or 
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concentration of political power and the underlying distributions of rights between 
citizens and citizens and the state”. Disaster response then becomes one of the 
venues through which political issues play out, diminishing or increasing actors’ 
resources, legitimacy and, in effect, power. The apparent apolitical dimensions of 
disasters can provide a useful façade behind which to conceal  the political 
manoeuvring processes of state, societal  and humanitarian actors around aid flows. 
Stil l , a balanced view must be reached. Aid and disaster response are partly (hidden) 
politics, with the goal of furthering one’s  interests (or those of the funder), but they 
are not only a game of the ‘bigger forces’. Aid dynamics are complex, as aid acts as a 
“conduit between places and people, facil itating relief and reconstruction assistance 
as well  as political legitimacy and, hence, the political and economic stability of a 
place” (Kleinfeld 2007, 170). 
 
4.2.1 Disaster response in low-intensity conflicts  
The ever-present politics of disaster becomes especially poignant in cases of conflict. 
That includes LIC settings, which are associated with relatively low numbers of 
casualties. LICs make up the largest share of conflict events and are globally on the 
rise (HIIK 2016; Human Security Report Project 2016). Ethiopia, where cycles of 
protests and state repression with l inked sporadic outbursts of violence existed prior 
to the 2016 drought, can be considered a case of LIC. As noted by political historian 
Markakis (2011), 20th century Ethiopia went through a continuous struggle towards 
imperial  then military then federal  state-building, marked by violence, dissent, and 
bloodbaths. At the start of the 21st century stil l , “past wars have not resolved border 
disputes, and politically motivated insurgencies remain endemic” (Markakis 2011, 
16). He moreover notes the presence of clashes concerning scarce resources, and 
inter-ethnic feuds which can take near-genocidal  dimensions. These feuds were 
mentioned during my fieldwork also, alongside accusations of state forces fuelling or 
even being present on one or the other side of the ethnic conflict. 
 
Azar’s  (1990) conceptualisation of protracted social conflict helps to grasp the source 
of these tensions: a disarticulation of state and society, whereby the institutional  
state is dominated by a single group or coalition perceived as unresponsive to the 
needs of other groups in society. Next to Myanmar and Iran, Ethiopia is cited as an 
exemplary case where the nation, and state, is associated with one dominant core 
cultural  group imposing its hegemony on other groups in the periphery (Young 1982, 
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p. 175 cited in Markakis 2011, 14). The Amhara, descendants of the Abyssinian 
empire builders, form the cultural  elite. Yet, they have been kept out of power by 
the Tigray people since the Tigray People’s  Liberation Front (later in coalition with 
other parties under the Ethiopian People’s  Revolutionary Democratic Front) fought, 
and ultimately won, an “ethno-regional  l iberation war” from 1975 to 1991 (Abbink 
2006, 389). Overall  and as presented by Markakis (2011), Ethiopia is marked by a 
centre–periphery divide between those highland areas which are inhabited by the 
Amhara and Tigray people, and the periphery of the lowlands, which also include the 
Oromo and the Somali . Both the Oromo and Somali  have contested the central  state 
in legal and less legal ways. Ethnic political parties and liberation fronts, activist 
cultural  performances, armed struggles, pamphlets on dispossession from one’s  own 
land and resources, and calls for secession were all  part of the repertoires of 
resistance (Abbink 2006; Markakis 2011). 
 
‘Integration’ of diverse groups under one nation can be perceived as ‘domination’, 
especially when the process is not associated with power sharing and reforms 
concerning decision making over key resources such as land and water (Markakis 
2011). In Ethiopia, ethnic federalism was introduced in 1991 as a solution to the 
“widespread, prolonged and violent political conflict that had brought the state to 
the brink of collapse”. However, its opponents, and Markakis (2011, 304), argue that 
even though structures and the elite have partially changed, the new system 
“preserves  the hegemony of the centre”. The Ethiopian People’s  Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) party dominated the federal  state and accorded “ethno-
cultural  communities” the right to “self-determination and self-rule” in the 1991 
ethno-federalist Constitution (Maru 2010, 39). In practice, the federal  state became 
“stronger than any previous Ethiopian state”, “developed structures of central 
control  and top-down rule” and neglected “political l iberties, respect for human 
rights and economic equality”—with identity and ethnic group tensions, democratic 
deficit and conflict as corollaries (Aalen 2006; Abbink 2011, 596). The Ethiopian 
police, military and security organs are cited as “most developed state institutions” 
and “key instruments of violence” (Markakis 2011, 14). In 2011 stil l, Markakis (2011, 
14–15) wrote that “one of the last frontiers Ethiopian rules have to cross is to redress 
the imbalance of power that marginalises the majority of its people and is the cause 
of endless strife”. Failure to do this “makes  it impossible to forge a system of 
government based on consensus and legitimacy” (Markakis 2011, 14–15). 
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In LIC settings marked by heightened (ethnic) polarisation, where “sometimes  
unrecognized or poorly understood forces can suddenly and often unexpectedly  
come into play” (Karl , 2005 cited in Kingsbury 2014, 352), disasters are especially 
l ikely to disrupt daily l ife and affect institutional change (Pelling and Dill , 2010). 
Although we would expect large-scale disaster events to lead to an immediate plea 
for international  aid, governments involved in LIC settings may have the opposite 
reaction, minimising the need for aid to keep “foreign influences” out (Kinross 2004). 
Indeed, as the legitimacy of the state is already internally under threat (Ghani and 
Lockhart 2009), humanitarian actors’ access may be fraught by contradictions 
between a national  government claiming sovereign control  over the response and 
the desire of international  agencies to safeguard a neutral  and independent space 
for humanitarian action. Carving out an independent humanitarian space is even 
more difficult when the authoritarian state doubles as a developmental  state, which 
derives its legitimacy from increasing capacities and achieving (economic) results 
(Mkandawire 2001). This applies to Ethiopia, where double-digit growth and 
infrastructure mega projects are pursued to reinforce the performance legitimacy of 
the government, rather than “political” considerations such as democracy (Abbink 
2011, 598). In disaster response terms, the developmental  state translates into (the 
depiction of) an effective state-led system supporting all  disaster victims, which 
makes it difficult for humanitarian actors to justify their “presence, access, and 
[independent] operational  space” beyond the channelling of funding (del Valle and 
Healy 2013, S189).  
 
This last statement hints at the importance of framing and role-playing for actors to 
negotiate legitimacy and the power to decide and act. In a context where state and 
society are disarticulated, inadequate disaster response can quickly (further)  
delegitimise authorities as responsible or capable in the eyes of the population or 
the international  community. Conversely, non-state actors such as political 
opposition parties can increase their legitimacy and, in turn, political support by 
criticising the state or even offering better aid provision (Flanigan 2008). Lacking the 
‘naturalised authority’ and coercive power which states can rely on to allocate 
resources or restrict other actors (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 982), international  
agencies rather depend on soft power, financial means and persuasion to deliver 
their services (Beetham 2013, 270). The processes of persuasion, crediting and 
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discrediting depend on successfully framing the disaster response as efficient and 
fair. A particular issue in LIC settings concerns the attention paid to minorities who 
may fall  outside the scope of government care.  
 
Given the importance of making a good impression, the politicisation of aid flows is 
largely hidden from sight in LIC settings. Actors’ room for manoeuvre is restricted 
not only by overt political actions, but also through everyday politics—the “quiet, 
mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized and direct” 
(Kerkvliet 2009, 232). Spatial  and bureaucratic restrictions are more likely to obstruct 
access than the physical boundaries or violent actions that present barriers in high-
intensity conflict settings (Corbet et al. 2017; Matelski  2016b). Aid agencies often 
find themselves seeking compromise with the authorities, and have to highlight their 
technical  expertise (del Valle and Healy 2013, S189).  
 
4.2.2 The two spaces of the humanitarian theatre 
Erving Goffman (1959) introduced his dramaturgic perspective on organisations to 
bring out the performative behaviour of people and teams in interaction. This theory 
recalls the famous opening of Will iam Shakespeare’s  ‘As  you like it’: “All  the world’s  
a stage, and all  the men and women merely players”. Goffman distinguishes the 
frontstage from the backstage. Frontstage, the team seeks to impress the audience 
with a total performance, where the décor, props, l ights and spoken words all convey 
confirmative facts supporting the chosen image. Backstage, the actors remove the 
frontstage masks, following their various goals but also gossiping and strategising 
about their next performance. 
 
The frontstage/backstage perspective has obvious analytical shortcomings in the 
study of aid. Unlike the idea of actors staging a play before an audience, impressions 
come about through interaction, and the audiences play an active role and likewise 
strategise—attributing images to the actors that are hard to reverse (Hilhorst, 
Weijers, and van Wessel 2012). Moreover, the boundary between front- and 
backstage is porous; in the backstage, actors may likewise perform with the aim to 
change social  reality. Especially with the Internet and social media, the backstage is 
not only visible, but often turns into another performative platform. Goffman noted 
that his use of these concepts was more rhetorical  than analytical, adding that the 
“claim that all  the world’s  a stage is sufficiently commonplace for readers to be 
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familiar with its l imitations and tolerant of its presentation, knowing that at any time 
they will  be able to demonstrate to themselves that it is not to be taken too 
seriously” (Goffman 1959, 246). The dramaturgic perspective is nonetheless useful 
to highlight the discursive games and role-playing that are so central  to the LIC 
scenario, and politics more widely (Hajer 2005).  
 
Tying together the concepts introduced above, the analysis is organised around two 
stages of the humanitarian theatre: 
 
1. The frontstage, where actors showcase their disaster response and dutifully 
play their roles of performing and coordinating aid with informed 
professionalism, using powerful  maps, impressive websites and other props 
to confirm this image; 
2. The backstage, where actors share their perceptions of how disaster 
response is actually shaped and carried out. Here, reflections on observed 
challenges and power relations come more easily to the fore. The same 
applies to actors’ hidden agendas—pushing for change that aligns with 
actors’ interests or the interests of those they represent, beyond strict 
humanitarian assistance. 
 
While the front- and the backstage can be considered different worlds, they also 
influence each other. Actors may choose to bring backstage observations frontstage 
via advocacy, or otherwise use their insights to navigate restrictions. Here, Hilhorst’s  
(2018a) concept of ‘ignorancy’ comes into play. Ignorancy recognises the naivety 
that aid actors sometimes display in the field as an expression of agency—a 
deliberate feigning of ignorance as a tactic to smoothen relations or appease certain 
political audiences. In some cases, displaying a lack of knowledge of the political is a 
pragmatic and conscious choice to gain the trust of authorities and access to certain 
areas. In this chapter, I am particularly interested in the questions of whether and 
how actors strategise to act upon their backstage observations. A closer look at the 
interface between the front- and backstage spaces is thus integral  to our analysis. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
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I conducted four months of qualitative fieldwork (February–July 2017), of which ten 
days of community fieldwork together with research partner Hone Mandefro. He 
carried out ten days of additional  research in July 2017. In Ethiopia, the data 
collection involved a total of 190 study participants, 118 of whom participated in 
semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions focusing on disaster response, 
especially how decision-making was shaped among different actors, as well  as 
general  and 2016-specific challenges and strategies. 
 
Four periods of research outside of the capital  provided in-depth insights (see Figure 
4.1 for an overview, sometimes intentionally approximate, of fieldwork locations). A 
first visit was made to a district of the Amhara region impacted by the 2016 drought 
but only peripherally affected by the political unrest. This enabled us to capture 
disaster response dynamics first, and to test fieldwork questions in a politically less 
sensitive area. Two subsequent episodes of two-week fieldwork are particularly 
central  here; they were conducted in the Oromiya and Amhara regions, in areas 
where drought and primarily anti-government motivated unrest coincided in 2016. 
Finally, one additional trip was made to Jijiga, capital  of the Somali  region, 
accompanying donors visiting 2017 drought response sites. This trip allowed for 
direct observation of interactions between all  actors of the aid chain, but did not 
i l luminate 2016 LIC–drought relations per se—if only because the conflict dynamics 
which mark the Somali  region differ markedly from what was observed in 2016 
during the Oromiya and Amhara protests.  
 
To preserve the participants’ confidentiality and safety in 2016 protest hotspots, 
community-level focus group discussions were held only during the first visit. 
Additional  data were collected through observation and exchanges at community  
level, as well  as during formal and informal meetings of NGO and international  
organisation (IO) staff members. Further, secondary sources including official 
humanitarian reports, press clippings and the transcripts of four interviews relating 
to humanitarian aid constraints conducted in 2015 by Corbet et al. (2017) were 
analysed. All  collected material  was stored and analysed using NVIVO. 
 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the semi-structured interview participants by actor 
type. We included government officials from the lowest governance level, called the 
kebele, to the federal  level. In l ine with interpretivism (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
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2012), we acknowledge that all  statements relate back to the participants’ subjective 
framing of the disaster and of the LIC, the dynamics of which varied greatly by 
location, and their own motives in ‘performing’ in the PhD study. Far from seeking 
to present the ‘truth’, hard facts and broad generalisations, we see divergences and 
diverse interpretations as integral  to our findings. 
 
Discussing the sensitive topics of protests, the State of Emergency and even some 
effects of drought (e.g. cholera outbreaks) was not without risk for the research 
participants. We addressed this by applying strict confidentiality rules (Chakravarty 
2012; Matelski  2014). The confidentiality of individuals, institutions and localities 
was guaranteed, and local  officials’ authorisation to conduct fieldwork in a particular 
location was always obtained. As much as possible, we maintained strict ethics of 
transparency, although we did, for instance, de-emphasise our interest in the 
political unrest in interviews with authorities. 
 
Table 4.1. Overview of research participants per actor type in Ethiopia. 
Actor category In-depth interview and focus 
group discussion participants* 
Community members 38 
Ethiopian government officials from kebele, woreda, 
zonal, regional and federal levels 
22 
Ethiopian non-governmental organisation staff 14 
International non-governmental organisation staff 31 
International organisation staff including UN agencies 9 
Donors/foreign government officials 6 
Research institution members, Ethiopian or foreign 2 
Tota l  122 
* Participant numbers refer to individual in-depth interviews, except for community members who in some 
instances participated in focus groups instead of individual interviews. The INGO staff interviews include 
four interviews conducted by Corbet et al. (2017). 
 
In our interactions with community members and humanitarian actors, indicating 
interest in and knowledge of the political in a context where it is systematically 
backgrounded could increase trust and openness. However, it was necessary not to 
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go too far, and we adapted our approach depending on the situation. Non-engaging 
questions on drought impacts, especially when beginning to discuss displacement 
and deaths, helped to gauge whether the researchers and participants were willing 
to move backstage or would continue to provide the ‘correct’ frontstage answers to 
ostensibly apolitical  questions on disaster governance.4 The humanitarian theatre 
concept thus served not only as an analytical device, but also as a methodological  
tool. The interviewee’s  and interviewer’s  positions in the theatre also varied across 
research settings. During the first days of local fieldwork, kebele officials l iked to 
select the community participants themselves, with interviews often conducted 
adjacent to government compounds. Only after trust was established and the 
researchers were granted freedom of movement and selection did the community  
participants volunteer more critical reflections. 
 
4.4 Context 
 
“If it is a choice between making this public and not receiving aid, then we can do 
without the aid” (Sheperd, 1985 cited in Keller 1992, 610). This statement, made by 
an Ethiopian empire official to a UN representative during the 1973 famine, 
encapsulates the politicisation of disaster response in a country marked by cycles of 
drought and civil  unrest spanning three governance regimes. Following the imperial  
government’s  initial efforts to cover up the 1973 famine, the military regime (1974–
1987) “seemed more interested in pursuing a political agenda of statist control 
rather than a strategy designed to achieve food security” (Keller 1992, 623). The 
military regime also instrumentalised humanitarian aid for its 1980s resettlement 
programme. The rebels, managing the drought response in areas they held in the 
northern part of the country, were accused of misusing humanitarian aid for war 
purposes (Gill  2010). Ultimately, the failure to quickly recognise and respond to the 
1973 and 1984 droughts contributed to the demise of both the imperial  and the 
military regimes. In the 21st century, instances of interlinked mobility and food 
security considerations (Hammond 2011) and politically motivated food aid 
beneficiary selection5 (Cochrane and Tamiru 2016) are still reported under the rule 
                                                                 
4 Cochrane and Tamiru (2016, 653) similarly identified Ethiopian Public Safety Net Programme (PSNP) 
beneficiaries who preferred to stick to the correct/official answers in interviews because of fear of 
retaliation and the absence of direct reward. 
5 This specifically refers to the selection of pro-government community members as PSNP beneficiaries. 
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of a government coalition headed by the EPRDF, which defeated the military regime 
in 1991. 
 
The EPRDF government came to power promising democratisation. As it submitted 
itself to democratic vote for the third time in 2005, it appeared the opposition had 
won more seats than the ruling party expected. That same election night, the prime 
minister banned demonstrations and public meetings in urban areas, and the post-
election demonstrations and violence left 193 civil ians dead (Aalen and Tronvoll  
2009; Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007). The 2005 national  elections marked a 
turning point in terms of democratisation and space for civil  society, with many 
important repercussions for Ethiopian politics today. The 2010 national  election, in 
which the EPRDF won all  but two seats, was rated as “short of standards of a free 
and fair election” (European Union Election Observation Mission 2010) and has been 
characterised as “re-establishing the one party state” (Tronvoll  2011). The 
government has been regularly blamed for repressing human rights and persecuting 
journalists and political opposition leaders (Amnesty International  2012; Human 
Rights Watch 2010, 2013). Government control  extends to grassroots level, with a 
local ‘development armies ’ network linked to the ruling party, monitoring the 
population with a ratio of one party observer to five residents. Aalen and Tronvoll  
(2009, 195) concluded that “the excessive clampdown on the political opposition and 
civil  society, coupled with the launch of new and repressive laws and the expansion 
of local  structures of control and coercion, all demonstrated that the outcome of the 
2005 elections was not more democracy, but more authoritarianism”. 
 
The restricted civil  society space affected humanitarian actors’ work. Agencies 
working on disaster response are no longer under the supervision of the Disaster 
Prevention and Preparedness Commission, which manages all  response processes, 
but of the administrative Charities and Societies Agency. A 2009 declaration of this 
Agency and follow-up amendments constrain the involvement of foreign-funded 
NGOs in human rights advocacy and restrict NGOs’ administrative expenses to a 
maximum of 30% of total  budget, with vague interpretations of both what human 
rights advocacy is and what constitutes an administrative expense (International  
Centre for Non-Profit Law 2012). Moreover, reliance on international  funding is 
restricted, leading many ENGOs to struggle for their survival  in “intensive care units” 
(i .e. operating in ‘emergency mode’, geared towards their own survival) instead of 
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challenging the status quo (ENGO #29, 12.06.2017).6  International  humanitarian 
institutions are not exempted from this situation, as international  humanitarian 
resources such as health support (Carruth 2016) and refugee care (Corbet et al. 2017) 
are increasingly funnelled through governmental  institutions and staff. Corbet et al. 
(2017) detail  how this is closely related to practical restrictions (e.g. scarce business 
visas, suspicious and hierarchical working culture with threats of expulsion, 
government monitoring oriented around numbers and output), sub-quality 
operations and conformism. 
The increasing restrictions on aid have not impeded the steady growth of the volume 
of aid directed towards Ethiopia, “confirming it as one of the largest [Official  
Development Assistance] beneficiaries worldwide” (Fantini  and Puddu 2016, 91). In 
2016, Ethiopia received 5.8% of global aid flows, of which 46.5% came from the 
United States, in a world ridden by disasters, conflict, and foreign aid shortages (UN 
OCHA 2017a). This places Ethiopia as fifth largest humanitarian beneficiary country, 
after the war-torn countries of Syria, Iraq, Yemen and South Sudan. Reviewing 
existing l iterature regarding the fact that large amounts of development assistance 
supposedly l inked to conditions of good governance and democracy are channelled 
towards a not so democratic country, Fantini  and Puddu (2016) point towards the 
negotiation skil ls of ‘aid speak’-savvy Ethiopian elites, as well  as overarching 
economic and geopolitical drivers such as the global  ‘war on terror’. They note how 
development donors “invoke […] the emergence of exceptional  conditions—typically 
droughts, famines or displacement—to bypass conventional  standards of 
democracy, accountability and transparency” in Ethiopia (Fantini  and Puddu 2016, 
100). One of our research participants, a highly placed humanitarian diplomat (IO#6, 
22.3.2017) also highlighted the importance for the United States especially to keep 
investments and presence in the one “relatively stable country” amidst a very 
unstable region. With regards to this objective, democratic concerns would only be 
secondary.  
 
Limiting space for civil  society and political opposition reduces regime criticism and 
dissent, but it can also lead to particularly violent repression when resistance does 
occur. The 2015/2016 drought overlapped with the longest sustained and 
                                                                 
6 Statements drawn from interviews or focus group discussions are presented with information on the 
type of actor and date. Here, the statement originates from ENGO member #29 during a phone call held 
on 12 June 2017. 
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geographically most widespread protests since the start of the current regime. The 
protests were triggered by the intention of having an integrated urban master plan 
of Addis Ababa encroaching on the surrounding Oromia Zone, but were built on 
deep-seated dissatisfaction with the current political arrangement (Abbink 2016). 
The Oromo form the largest population group, yet have consistently been excluded 
from power, at least until  the 2018 political reforms. Particularly large and brutally 
repressed riots occurred in Oromiya at the end of 2015, and in Oromiya (again most 
intensively) and Amhara in summer 2016. The pressure from market forces and 
foreign investors is particularly high on Oromo land (Markakis 2011, 356), and has 
led to Oromo farmers being dispossessed (Abbink 2016). It comes as l ittle surprise 
that during the 2016 protests, Dutch-owned flower farms were amongst the first 
attacked. Although they form part of the cultural  elite, the Amhara also have been 
side-lined from power under the EPRDF regime. Abbink (2016) recounts how, 
emboldened by the Oromiya protests and facing their own land dispute issues, 
Amhara protesters took to the street, attacking “administration offices, police 
stations and army troops”, in July 2016.  
 
The protests were stifled by the declaration of a ten-month State of Emergency in 
October 2016, restricting the rights to assembly and information. Tens of thousands 
were jailed without formal legal proceedings, and hundreds were kil led by security 
forces (Abbink 2016; Amnesty International  2017; Human Rights Watch 2016). 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show that, geographically, the areas of political unrest and the 
food insecurity that guided humanitarian action were largely overlapping. This does 
not signify a causal relation, but it did further test relations between aid, societal  and 
government actors. 
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Figure 4.2. Protests and violence in 2015–2016 Ethiopia, as compiled based on internet and radio claims 
by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (British Broadcasting Corporation 2016). 
 
55 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Areas affected by the 2015–2016 El Niño-induced droughts (dashed areas) (UN OCHA 2017b). 
 
4.5 Findings: Disaster response performances and experiences in the 
humanitarian theatre 
 
This section analyses how roles and power relations evolved in the governance of 
the humanitarian response to the 2016 drought, and how this was affected by 
political events, according to different actors. 
 
4.5.1 Frontstage 
We start our analysis with the frontstage, where the spotlights shine bright and 
humanitarian response comes across as especially well  organised. The core tenet of 
the ‘Ethiopian humanitarian fairy-tale’ is efficient collaboration between diverse 
humanitarians and a proactively and financially highly engaged Ethiopian 
government, which reportedly contributed at least USD 735 mill ion to the 2015–
2016 drought response (UN OCHA and GoE 2016). Different actors recount the story 
using similar words, as shown by the following interview quotes from highly placed 
members of the GoE and an IO, and a statement made by an INGO member during a 
regional  multi-actor meeting including government officials: 
 
56 
 
 
So what was the magic behind having 10 mill ion people impacted, but no 
crisis? […] [we have] a joint UN, government and INGO forum. All  speak the 
same language! You might not see that in other countries. (Federal 
government official  #1, 9.6.2017) 
 
How do we decide who gets to be on the decision-making bodies? All  
country representatives of all  humanitarian agencies are there; whoever is 
not present is not present, but that does not really happen here. Because of 
the nature of Ethiopia […] Our approach, understanding of what 
coordination means, is to lead people to consensus […] It is about providing 
the evidence, having trust to ensure that people feel comfortable and 
confident. (IO #1, 2.3.2017) 
 
We are not hiding. We are not fighting, competing, but work together to 
have water for the community. (INGO #7, 9.3.2017) 
 
According to these statements, the humanitarian model is not only efficient because 
of a high level of understanding between the actors, but also thanks to its clockwork-
like organisation. As can be expected in a performance-oriented developmental  
state setting showcasing high capacities, processes are technical and systematised. 
This came through in interviews via the frequent naming of acronyms, 
institutionalised meeting platforms (e.g. the Strategic Multi-Agency Coordination 
Meeting and sector meetings co-chaired by a l ine ministry and associated UN organ), 
performance targets reached (dispatched trucks and quintals, number of 
beneficiaries l isted in the bi-annual  Humanitarian Requirements Documents, e.g. UN 
OCHA and GoE 2016) and codified processes. Concerning such processes, a key date 
on the humanitarian calendar is the belg assessment; around 200 staff members  
from the GoE, UN agencies, NGOs and donors are deployed throughout the country 
each June to assess the previous rainy season’s  (belg) performance. An intricate l ist 
of indicators (e.g. harvest expectations, market prices) then leads to the 
classification of districts, called woredas, according to three prioritisation levels that 
are neatly pictured in different tones of yellow to red on GoE/UN OCHA co-printed 
maps. Many participants described this assessment process as technical  and 
inclusive to all  interested parties. The codification of processes can also be found at 
the local level. An ENGO staff member (#24, 17.5.2017) started his interview with a 
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detailed 14-step description of the disaster response process, from the “analysis by 
local NGO, woreda and zonal government staff” to “the official  launch when our NGO 
project gets the green light, together with the donor and line offices”. 
All  these processes add up to an intricately institutionalised response to food 
insecurity. The response follows a techno-logistic script; no negotiations are needed 
beyond settling logistical glitches, such as firing corrupt kebele government officials 
accused by higher-placed officials of causing gaps in the response (woreda  
government official  #24, 8.6.2017; woreda government official #27, 9.6.2017). 
Moreover, there are few blind spots, as INGOs are presented as “hav[ing] eyes on 
the ground everywhere, wherever they have presence they can provide ground truth 
data” (IO #1, 2.3.2017).  
 
Strikingly, the script largely centres on IOs, the national  government and funders. 
There is l ittle space for community initiatives or most ENGOs, with the exception of 
ENGOs politically, administratively and financially affi l iated to ruling parties. We 
approached one such ENGO in Amhara. It manages all  governmental  aid storage 
facil ities in the region, and continued doing so throughout the protests (ENGO #45, 
8.6.2017; ENGO #46, 17.6.2017). ENGOs were never named as drought responders 
without prompting. Following prompting, ENGOs were described as important, 
embedded and trusted by the communities, but their capacity was seen as too low 
to be part of the efficient system. An Oromiya zonal government official  (#2, 
15.5.2017) described community members as not doing anything without 
government command. 
 
Although all  participants referred to consensus-based decision making, Ethiopian 
government officials usually described a government-centred system rather than a 
co-governed situation. A regional  official, for instance, described the role of UN 
OCHA as “the secretaries at the forum […] they take the minutes” (#1, 5.4.2017). An 
INGO member who had recently arrived in the country to manage emergenc y 
response operations (#29, 25.3.2017) reflected on one of the official meetings she 
attended at regional  level:  
 
On one hand, strong government is good; they should own it. But as an 
INGO I feel we are being directed by government, and the UN as well. An 
[Ethiopian government official] said in one of the meetings where I was, ‘the 
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UN is government’. So he does not see the difference. And in his opinion the 
NGOs are there to be told where to go, what to do. 
Although this hierarchy is recognised by most non-state actors as well, it is not 
openly challenged. The central  role of the government is considered legitimate, 
especially given the size and diversity of the country. A strong and engaged 
government prevents replication and makes it possible to feed over 20 million 
drought-impacted people.7 
 
Protests and the State of Emergency 
Our participants mentioned the impact of the protests and State of Emergenc y 
lightly, if at all . Strikingly, the protests were not mentioned in any of the UN OCHA’s  
weekly one-page Humanitarian Bulletin updates released during the most intense 
protest phase (June–September 2016). A first mention of the protests was made on 
10 October, when the Bulletin directly cited the Federal  Office’s  Attorney General  in 
relation to the State of Emergency (UN OCHA 2016a):  
 
The rule of emergency was declared to restore order, ensure safety of the 
public and stability of the state. [According to the Attorney General,] ‘[t]he 
nature of recent violent demonstrations and conflicts that led to the loss of 
l ives and destruction of properties make the State of Emergency crucial ’. 
 
On 24 October (UN OCHA 2016b), the Bulletin made another mention of the State of 
Emergency, stressing that humanitarian partners who continued to assist the 
government sought clarity on their role: 
 
the Humanitarian Country Team seeks formal clarity on how the 
humanitarian response can continue amid restrictions stipulated in the 
State of Emergency on restriction of movement, designated ‘red zones’ and 
restricted freedom of assembly.  
 
The subject was subsequently dropped again. According to all non-state participants, 
possible impacts of the protests and State of Emergency were very rarely discussed 
                                                                 
7 This includes PSNP beneficiaries, who are most the vulnerable and do receive annual food aid but are not 
officially part of the ‘humanitarian aid beneficiaries’ statistics. 
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in official meetings where government officials were present. At most, specific 
incidents such as attacked warehouses and trucks were mentioned, and these were 
not described as politically motivated or more taxing than the usual  logistical 
difficulties: “There were reports of food not being dispatched quickly enough from 
warehouses. Does it happen every year? Yes it does […] It is a complicated operation” 
(IO #1, 1.3.2017). As shown by the second Bulletin quote, the topic was raised only 
insofar as the protests and State of Emergency would interfere with the techno-
logistic script of the drought response. 
 
4.5.2 Backstage 
Moving behind the curtain, the contrast between the frontstage performance and 
the backstage governance of the drought response and the impacts of political 
turmoil, as described by the research participants, is striking.  
 
Backstage, non-state participants emphasised government control  rather than 
inclusive collaboration. Here, the “government-led response, with a quasi-Weberian 
iron cage of bureaucracy” (IO #8, 28.4.2017) was mentioned in more negative terms. 
Bureaucratic regulations combined with a lack of clarity make the GoE the major 
decision maker concerning, among other things, the timing and scale of the response 
(a GoE appeal  to the international  community is necessary) and the selection of 
activities, areas (permits must be granted) and beneficiaries.  
 
Backstage, the effective capacity of the government, usually praised frontstage, was 
sometimes put in a different perspective. Community members in all  visited areas, 
including the less LIC-affected Amhara woreda, mentioned widespread targeting 
‘errors’ resulting in the exclusion of people lacking basic means from the aid 
distribution, or in the flat distribution of food aid, regardless of family size. Because 
of the seeming disorganisation of government officials in charge of distribution, we 
witnessed vil lagers waiting for days in the town to collect their (sometimes already 
spoiled) monthly aid supplies. An Amhara ENGO member (#45, 8.6.2017) reported 
that disabled people, the elderly and lactating mothers had to pay helpers to bring 
them the food from the warehouse, as they could not go themselves. 
 
Beyond mentioning these deviations from the ‘faultless’ techno-logistic script, 
backstage stories explicitly focused on the politicisation of the drought response. 
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Rather than merely following the techno-logic, food aid quotas are up- or down-sized 
at different governance levels for political reasons, and corruption and people’s 
political affi l iations reportedly come into play in local  officials’ screening of 
beneficiaries. One highly placed IO official noted that “our local staff is under a lot of 
government pressure”, ultimately reaching the conclusion that “targeting is an 
il lusion invented by [the agency] and the government to please the donors” (IO #7, 
27.4.2017). 
 
These accounts contradict the technical, efficient and needs-based frontstage 
depictions of screening and distribution. Representatives of NGOs, community  
members and some IOs further lamented the lack of independence, on-the-ground 
monitoring and complaint mechanisms—in short, a disconnect between disaster 
response actors and the communities they want to help. The following quotes  
further highlight the limited independence of disaster response actors, which was 
also noticed by GoE officials and community members: 
 
Ideally, the NGOs should bring up ground experiences to high levels […]  
Here, NGOs can at most become contractors to do the work the government 
wants them to do. They are not really seen as partners or innovators; their 
potential  is not used. (Donor #2, 17.3.2017) 
 
If INGOs had the chance to get direct contact with the community—that is 
my wish. Now the government is the one communicating and deciding. So 
there is a big chance in using that for other purposes. (Oromiya woreda 
government official  #2, 12.5.2017) 
 
Donors should participate in the activities we prefer. The contact to us 
should be direct. Without any interference. Now it is not direct contact. 
(Oromiya community member #1, 11.5.2017) 
 
Linked to this issue of l imited independence, the main challenge identified by 
participants in the backstage area was not logistics but information—the lack of it, 
but especially its distortion and its political use. An INGO member’s  (#44, 25.5.2017) 
summary exemplified the statements of many: “Here, you can’t give numbers 
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without the government blessing. Information sharing is such a sensitive issue in 
Ethiopia. What you state should always be linked to a government source”. 
 
Citing government sources is a difficult feat when numbers are hard to come by or 
to trust. For the 2015–2016 drought, “it took a long time for the government to really 
become transparent about [the] volume, size, and extent of the problem” (donor #2, 
17.3.2017). The historical taboos surrounding drought-induced death, displacement 
and outbreaks of diseases such as cholera also make obtaining information or 
programme authorisations difficult. Some agencies have to work for a drought 
impact to be recognised before starting to take action on it, or grapple with 
alternative terms, such as “acute watery diarrhoea” for cholera. The associated 
challenges are numerous, impacting, among other things, fundraising, planning, and 
importing drugs that require special  authorisation. The controversy around 
information was apparent in many interviews, where the frontstage and backstage 
of the drought response fused into frequently contradictory statements, such as in 
an interview with an Oromiya-based INGO official (#38, 10.5.2017). Early on in the 
interview, in response to a question of whether his INGO conducted its own 
assessments, he replied, “We do not do our own. We support them, the government. 
It is better for us if we participate with them. The information from them is real”. He 
then contradicted himself 30 minutes later, when asked to elaborate on the ideal 
shape of disaster response: “It would be better if [INGOs] did assessments. We 
receive reports only. Reading and seeing is a different thing. Also we should 
participate in monitoring. As it is now, we have too limited access”. 
 
Protests and the State of Emergency 
The protests and State of Emergency impacted the drought response much more 
than the frontstage performance suggests. A number of incidents occurred, such as 
attacks on aid transports, warehouses and government facil ities, as well  as 
government officials raiding NGO cars and preventing access. In Oromiya, where 
unrest would “happen every day in a new place, without possibilities to predict”, the 
situation was “very challenging” (IO #9, 30.5.2017), to the extent that some INGOs 
called their field staff back to Addis for a few days. One IO member also reported (IO 
#9, 30.5.2017) that his agency had started planning with regional  GoE authorities, 
keeping federal  instances in the dark, for ways of dispatching aid other than via the 
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government system (i.e. relying on more locally accepted ENGOs or civil society) in 
case the civil  servants were kicked out and the people took control. 
 
Our field visits further confirmed that the protests and State of Emergency impacted 
drought response. In a protest-ridden district of the Amhara region, food distribution 
was suspended for one month (ENGO #45, 8.6.2017). Stories of aid trucks set on fire 
and aid storage robbery attempts were reported in several  woredas (ENGO #46, 
17.6.2017). In the visited Oromiya kebele, which was described as a conflict hotspot, 
drought response activities of the government (e.g. health posts, school feeding 
programmes) and NGOs (e.g. food aid distribution) halted as violence increased from 
both the population and the government. An INGO member described the summer  
months as “our hibernation” (#38, 10.5.217), imposed first because of security and 
then official  access restrictions. 
 
Many Oromiya participants considered the State of Emergency to have reduced 
violence and saved lives. However, although the State of Emergency was considered 
to have enabled the drought response by increasing safety, it was also seen as having 
impeded the response. Information flows were interrupted by week-long Internet 
outages and regular phone network outages (Jeffrey 2016). Access to certain areas, 
visas, work permits and information became more difficult. According to one foreign 
embassy official (donor #9, 21.4.2017) this happened because “there was some fear 
of people with a political mandate coming in on wake of humanitarian aid workers. 
That was basically seen as worse than having [a] big number of people helping the 
population”. 
 
The interviews brought out that the impact of the protests and State of Emergenc y 
were much more profound and political than mere logistical challenges. INGO 
representatives felt that they were inadvertently placed in the conflict. For example, 
when rioters burnt down a government grain storage facility, a neighbouring storage 
facil ity, managed by an INGO, was attacked and had grain stolen, although it was not 
burnt down. The government then assigned soldiers to protect the stil l-standing 
INGO warehouse. The INGO official tell ing this story (#28, 23.3.2017) recalled, “We 
did not l ike that, because it would look like we were siding with the government. But 
at same time, we cannot take the soldiers off, because there is unrest and we must 
keep a good relationship”. 
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The direct involvement of NGOs was limited, and NGOs (without much debate) 
avoided acting on behalf of victims of political violence, mainly because these groups 
saw human rights issues as outside their mandate. Only one interviewed staff 
member and one driver at the same ENGO reported seeing it as their (personal) duty 
to assist wounded conflict victims. NGOs nonetheless became part of the politics. 
Some local participants expressed that the NGOs do “not need to come if they do 
not help fight the government” (Oromiya community member #9, 15.5.2017). 
Government officials sometimes accused NGOs of supporting protesters. The 
aforementioned driver told me animatedly how he was even hit by a government 
representative while assisting a wounded woman. 
 
The interviews also brought to l ight how the drought response was instrumentalised 
to stop the protests. Areas and protesters were removed from beneficiary l ists, and 
people were rewarded for not protesting or for informing on fellow community  
members, according to a woreda GoE official (#2, 12.5.2017), reporting the words of 
a colleague: “If you calm down, we will  support you again, even if you did something 
wrong to the government”. 
 
There were also hints that the State of Emergency more largely affected civil  
society’s  capacities to deal with the drought. A community member with a higher 
position in the indigenous Gada Oromo governance system reported additional  
impacts on civil society (#12, 15.5.2017): 
 
When the unrest happened, we organised more. To support each other , 
amongst the tribe clans, the Gada system. Finding homes for the displaced, 
re-distributing food […] but the Gada, after the declaration of the State of 
Emergency, we had to stop, as we could not have meetings of more people. 
 
4.5.3 Front- and backstage interfaces 
The two sections above have highlighted the gaps between the frontstage stories 
and backstage experiences and narratives, which are summarised in Table 4.2.  
 
In this section, I describe how non-state actors dealt with the contradictions between 
the frontstage and the backstage. The section only deals with non-state participants, 
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because contradictions were extremely rarely acknowledged by Ethiopian state 
officials, and were accompanied by the regret that there was nothing they could do 
about this (beyond ‘hidden strike’ levels of going about daily tasks, as mentioned by 
zonal government official #1, 22.5.2017). One of the aspects Goffman associated 
with the backstage is strategising to influence the frontstage performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2. Main frontstage/backstage discrepancies in Ethiopia. 
Topic Frontstage Backstage 
Overarching 
governance 
mode 
Hierarchical co-governance 
among diverse state and aid 
actors  
Tight government control 
Challenges to 
the drought 
response 
Few, except for understandable 
logistical difficulties or 
corruption of lower 
government officials 
- Monopoly of the s tate on 
information and decision making 
- Pol i ticisation of aid 
Protests and 
State of 
Emergency 
impacts 
Negl igible - Protests  affecting the 
effectiveness of drought response 
- State of Emergency worsening the 
s i tuation in some areas (e.g. 
weakening local drought response 
mechanisms, aid as punishment or 
reward) 
 
Limited room for manoeuvre 
Many interviewees had no answer to the question of how they would deal with the 
concerns they articulated backstage. Interviewed community members all  expressed 
powerlessness in that regard. The few possibilities aid actors mentioned consisted 
of dealing with the system without openly discussing concerns or challenging the 
government. For example, they carefully selecting the ethnicity of staff to be based 
in a field office or to accompany field visits, they maintained parallel  information 
databases to have a more accurate picture of the humanitarian situation; they tried 
fighting GoE bureaucracy with evidence, numbers, and detailed memoranda of 
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understanding and donor guidelines. Highlighting such donor guidelines could for 
instance help them argue that they were simply not allowed to operate via 
government structures in a specific region. Agencies widely resorted to negotiating 
with the government within the dominant technical  discourse, stressing supposedly 
objective facts and figures to adjust certain needs analyses and emphasising the 
common interest in helping communities. INGOs, for example, stressed that they 
could advocate for certain issues and excluded populations as long as they remained 
technical  about it. Using indirect and non-confrontational  tactics to play the system 
required context-specific knowledge, negotiation skil ls and trusted contacts ranging 
from federal  bureaucrats to kebele officials. Only one participant reported an 
example of a large donor that—behind the scenes—wrote a confidential protest 
letter to the government in relation to the blockage of aid during the State of 
Emergency (INGO #38, 10.5.2017). 
 
Although silent diplomacy skil ls were important, independent action was 
constrained by many factors. Of paramount importance was information. Agencies 
usually had a l imited presence on the ground and often lacked the whole picture. 
There were few venues to address issues apart from raising them with the 
government, even when the government was the source of concern. An Oromiya 
ENGO member (#24, 17.5.2017) related how he had reported biased beneficiary 
screening to government l ine offices, although the bias came from government 
officials. According to him, “that is the only route; we can’t jump”. 
 
Three forms of self-censorship 
Although a number of factors l imited the room for manoeuvre and independent 
humanitarian action, it became clear that agencies also played a role in these 
limitations through self-censorship. Self-censoring emerged as one of the only self-
preservation strategies, taking three forms: self-censoring of words, actions and 
knowledge. 
 
Speaking out openly for an independent humanitarian space was presented as 
impossible and too dangerous, especially for ENGOs. Self-censoring also took place 
as organisations framed problems as logistical even when they were “obviously” 
political (INGO #6, 6.3.2017): “We cannot mention that the woreda government is 
not cooperative, but we can say that roads are bad”. Instead of openly raising an 
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issue, actors would mention 2016 conflict issues via less locally vulnerable actors, as 
was reported by an IO official (#9, 30.5.2017): 
 
We could not release a statement here; it would jeopardise the situation. 
We had to send it to New York. If tried here, the anger and concern of the 
federal  government… they would have said, let’s  shut down [the agency]. 
We had no choice. […] [A higher official] raised the issue with the prime 
minister when he visited. So we have windows. 
 
Self-censoring also happened in action and was often linked to actively suppressing 
knowledge. When I joined an NGO consortium on a monitoring field visit, they 
purposefully refrained from visiting a water pump site in a conflict area, “because 
then the government would know that we know” (INGO #7, 1.3.2017). ‘Ignorancy’ 
(Hilhorst 2018a) is also seen in the re-framing of humanitarian principles and 
mandates. Human rights issues especially are excluded from the mandate, despite 
the fact that this hampered the effectiveness and impartiality of the humanitarian 
response in 2016. An INGO director (#44, 25.5.2017) gave a surprising interpretation 
of the principle of neutrality, re-framed as ‘avoiding conflict areas’ in its programme. 
One ENGO member (#16, 12.4.2017), when asked about drought-related mortality, 
stated that “death is none of my business”. We do not interpret this as actual 
ignorance about humanitarian principles. Rather, actors deliberately chose to 
narrow their scope and present themselves as innocent and ignorant enactors of the 
techno-logistic disaster response script, hence relying on ‘ignorancy’ as a strategic 
device. 
 
Humanitarian attitudes towards independence 
A final  major finding from our interviews concerns the diverging attitudes of 
humanitarian participants regarding what should be done about the lack of 
independence of humanitarian aid. There was a common backstage 
acknowledgement of this situation: “The understanding of the humanitarian 
principles is smaller here [in Ethiopia]. Humanitarians here work on fi l ling 
government gaps” (ENGO #23, 10.5.2017). Our participants recounted three 
narratives about whether this situation was problematic. 
One group of participants, predominantly headquarter-based non-Ethiopian staff of 
the large and longer-established IOs and INGOs, stayed closely within the remit of 
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the frontstage narrative. As one IO representative said, “disaster response here is an 
enormous logistical challenge, but not necessarily one where adherence to 
humanitarian principles is strictly necessary” (IO #8, 28.4.2017). These 
humanitarians were convinced that the GoE is basically doing a good job under 
difficult (landscape-dictated) circumstances, especially compared with the huge 
famines of the past and with neighbouring countries. They considered Ethiopia to be 
effectively operating and posing few challenges to humanitarian organisations; they 
viewed Ethiopia as an easy post, and did not seem bothered by the government’s  
near-monopoly on information. 
 
Another group of participants, working in both international  and Ethiopian 
structures, acknowledged that there were problematic aspects to the drought 
response, but took a pragmatic view. They chose to balance the need for immediate 
response to the drought with the importance of good long-term relations with the 
government. They aimed to maximise room for manoeuvre by ‘playing the game’, as 
elaborated above. To them, keeping up the frontstage performance was part of a 
considered strategy of ‘ignorancy’.  
 
A third group of participants, usually members of ENGOs or of the globally more 
advocacy-oriented INGOs, but also IO/INGO international  staff members who had 
only recently arrived in the country, was very critical of the lack of humanitarian 
independence, especially in view of the State of Emergency: 
 
Overall, humanitarian space is l imited. And we partly l imit it ourselves. It is 
usually the UN’s  role to push for the humanitarian space; they have that 
privilege. But in Ethiopia, it has developed to a situation that all  think the 
government is more powerful, that you can’t push, can’t discuss. I felt last 
year, with the State of Emergency and all, it would clearly have been the 
moment to take a stronger position. (IO #11, 12.6.2017)  
 
These participants accused larger INGOs, IOs and donors of giving up on 
humanitarian principles and only being concerned with maintaining good relations 
and “running their big machines” in their oligarchic “country-club way of 
functioning” (INGO #45, 26.4.2017). According to these participants, financial and 
geopolitical  incentives, such as the ‘war on terror’, si lenced the humanitarian 
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community, and long-time humanitarian leaders had slipped into a comfortable 
routine and lost their critical edge. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
This analysis, detail ing humanitarian performances and experiences in the 
humanitarian theatre’s  two spaces and interfaces in Ethiopia, shines a l ight on stark 
discrepancies between the frontstage, where state and aid actors showcase the 
response, and the backstage, where they reflect on challenges and strategies. On the 
frontstage, all  actors agreed on the (hierarchical) co-governance of the drought 
response, largely ignoring the impacts of the political turmoil, whereas backstage, 
they were often concerned with the information and decision-making monopoly of 
the state, the inability to go the ‘last mile’ and interact directly with communities, 
the politicisation of aid, and the consequences of the unrest and State of Emergenc y. 
In 2016, the effectiveness and impartiality of the response to a 50-year drought was 
especially hampered. Although this cannot be generalised to Ethiopia overall  and the 
GoE’s  (financial) efforts and leadership were largely successful, participants of all  
backgrounds reported a lack of transparency and accountability, as well  as cases of 
biased response and aid being instrumentalised to reward or punish drought victims. 
 
Even more striking is how non-state actors behaved following their own observations 
of the frontstage/backstage gap. For all  actors, although especially civil society 
members including ENGOs, room for manoeuvre is extremely l imited. The frontstage 
remains quiet, as disaster response actors dismiss open discussion or advocacy, 
choosing instead to rely on self-censorship and ignorancy. They follow a narrowly 
defined mandate and adhere to the techno-logistic script to keep helping drought 
victims. But even backstage, silence abounds. With a few exceptions internal  to some 
organisations, it seems there is no collective conversation on where to draw the line 
between respecting the sovereignty of the government and the intrusion of 
humanitarian principles after conflict dynamics invade the humanitarian response. 
 
Our analysis shows how the restricted space available to Ethiopian civil  society 
impacted the humanitarian space, where humanitarians find the discretion to decide 
what needs to be addressed. Although it is common that the line between 
sovereignty and humanitarian space is hard to define and negotiate in practice, it 
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was found that decisions touching upon these themes were rarely debated within or 
between agencies, and hence remained outside the scope of reflection and 
evaluation. 
 
The plea made at the beginning of this chapter, to rekindle the discussion of the 
politics of aid in LIC settings, extends to scholarly work. It remains important to study 
what happens in Ethiopia, where violent and diverse conflict dynamics, including 
intra-ethnic conflict, unfold. There, over 1.8 mill ion displaced people are in need of 
humanitarian assistance, notwithstanding the 2018 political reforms (Internal  
Displacement Monitoring Centre 2020). But more research on this will  also be 
relevant for the increasingly numerous authoritarian and LIC settings around the 
world. 
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Chapter 5: Getting Relief to Marginalised Minorities: The 
Response to Cyclone Komen in 2015 in Myanmar8 
 
Abstract  
Based on four months of qualitative fieldwork in Myanmar in 2017–2018, this 
chapter explores whether and how civil  society organisations, international  non-
governmental  organisations, international  organisations, and donor agencies 
socially navigated the LIC context to try to provide relief to marginalised minorities 
in the ethnic states of Chin and Rakhine following cyclone Komen in 2015. The study 
findings detail  how civil  society actors mobilised parallel minority and Christian 
networks and lobbied international  actors to support disaster victims of Chin 
ethnicity. In Rakhine State, it was overwhelmingly international  humanitarian 
organisations that were able and will ing to support Muslims, including the Rohingya. 
This increased tensions among community groups and between Myanmar and the 
international  community. Particularly in the context of rising identity politics, 
humanitarian governance encompasses the governance of perceptions. Trade-offs 
between long-term acceptance and following humanitarian principles in aid 
allocation are largely unavoidable and must be carefully considered. 
 
 
                                                                 
8 This chapter is a minor revision of the published article: Desportes (2019c).  
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Figure 5.1. Key locations in Myanmar (Author 2020 based on Myanmar Information Management Unit 
2019).  
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5.1 Introduction 
 
When massive floods hit Myanmar’s 9 Rakhine State in summer 2015, members of 
the Muslim Rohingya minority fled their homes to seek refuge in government 
shelters. However, unlike their Buddhist neighbours, the Rohingya were turned 
away. They could have stayed at the shelters if they had signed documents  
identifying themselves as Bengalis, but they were very unlikely to do this. For 
decades, the Rohingya have battled to gain the official recognition as an ethnic group 
necessary to obtain Myanmar citizenship, which the Myanmar constitution ties to 
belonging to a recognised “national race” (Cheesman 2017; Parnini 2013).   
 
The above events were reported by The Burma Times (2015), an exile diaspora 
newspaper. They may have actually occurred, but the story may also simply be one 
bullet in the discursive battle surrounding the treatment of Myanmar’s multiple 
ethnic and religious minorities.10 In Myanmar, nationalist discourses ‘othering’ those 
who are not Buddhist or ethnically Bamar have permeated the societal, political and 
law-making spheres (Farzana 2015, 297–298; Lee 2016; Renshaw 2013; Wade 2017). 
Regardless of its veracity, the story calls for a closer look at the marginalisation 
minority groups faced in the 2015 disaster response after flooding and landslides 
were triggered by a heavy monsoon season and compounded by cyclone Komen 
throughout Myanmar. Most importantly, the story raises questions regarding how 
members of Myanmar’s vibrant civil  society and international humanitarians 
navigated a context where conflict and identity politics pl ayed out during the 
response. Although challenges confronting civil society and humanitarian actors in 
authoritarian and conflict-affected contexts have been explored (e.g., Desportes, 
Mandefro, and Hilhorst 2019; Harvey 2013; Kahn and Cunningham 2013 ; del Valle 
and Healy 2013), l ittle academic research has investigated the practices developed 
to overcome them. 
                                                                 
9 In this chapter, I use the term ‘Myanmar’, mirroring the usage of most of the research participants. The 
use of the term does not reflect partiality in a context where the political opposition rejected the term 
‘Myanmar’, which was unilaterally imposed by military rulers in 1989. 
10 Roughly 70% of the Myanmar population are of Bamar ethnicity according to the 1983 Census (Desaine 
2011, 28), and 78.9% are Buddhists according to the 2014 Census (Myanmar Ministry of Information 
2014). For decades, the government has aimed to “homogenise the multifaceted ethnic and cultural 
mosaic [that is Myanmar] into a national, unified, Bamar entity” (Desaine 2011, 12). The government 
recognises 135 different ethnic groups, excluding the Rohingya, as belonging to the nation (Myanmar 
Ministry of Information 2018).  
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Based on four months of qualitative fieldwork, this chapter aims to describe the 
challenges and navigation strategies  associated with supporting minority groups, as 
perceived and recounted by representatives of CSOs, INGOs and IOs that were part 
of the 2015 disaster response in Chin and Rakhine States  (see Figure 5.1). These 
states were chosen as the two ethnic regional states most impacted by the disasters, 
presenting different minority tension dynamics, and offering fieldwork possibil ities.  
 
Thus presenting not one but two case studies on minority support following the 2015 
disasters, this chapter inform two broader debates. The first concerns the 
understudied disaster–conflict nexus (E. King and Mutter 2014). How conflict and 
disaster dynamics interact is particularly poorly understood in settings of LIC, which 
are predominantly caused by intra-state political and social tensions  (HIIK 2016). 
Worldwide, most current conflicts are LICs  (HIIK 2016; Human Security Report 
Project 2016). Focusing on how disaster response is shaped towards minorities—
groups collectively identifying around characteristics such as ethnic origin, religion, 
culture, or language (Azar 1990)—places a magnifying glass on core LIC–disaster 
dynamics. This is especially true in a context of rising identity politics, where certain 
groups are marginalised in the politicised response, creating difficulties for 
humanitarian actors who remain political players despite their actions being driven 
by moral rather than political norms (Kahn and Cunningham 2013; del Valle and 
Healy 2013).  
 
The second debate involves minorities as a core friction point in discussions on 
humanitarian organisations’ interference in national state affairs (humanitarianism–
sovereignty tensions). Kahn and Cunningham (2013, S139) note that, in recent 
decades, a “fundamental gap has developed between states and international 
humanitarian actors in terms of describing what sovereignty entails and how it is 
expressed”, and that how these tensions can be managed, especially by 
humanitarian actors, needs to be better understood. The well -being of people 
caught up in crises constitutes “the contested ground on which states and 
humanitarian actors clash” (Kahn and Cunningham 2013, S139). Often, especially in 
authoritarian LIC settings and certainly in Myanmar (Décobert 2016; Matelski 2016b; 
Smith 2010), contestation over minorities ’ welfare and rights is particularly intense.  
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5.2 Challenges and social navigation practices to support 
minorities in authoritarian low-intensity conflict settings 
 
As politically and socially shaped events, disaster response processes reveal the 
dynamics criss-crossing society, state and aid relations (Hutchison, 2014; Pelling and 
Dill , 2010). This is particularly true in conflict-affected countries, although it is 
important to differentiate among conflict types  (van Voorst and Hilhorst 2017). LICs 
are marked by fewer violent events and deaths compared with high-intensity 
conflicts, but they show high levels of volatil ity and structural violence, such as the 
marginalisation of minority groups by the state (Azar 1990). Disaster response can 
then be the very conduit through which the LIC is played out, further sidelining 
minorities, harming political opponents or increasing political support (see Flanigan 
(2008) [Lebanon and Sri Lanka]; Jacoby and Özerdem (2008) [Turkey]; Desportes, 
Mandefro, and Hilhorst (2019) [Ethiopia]). When a disaster unfolds in a LIC setting, 
state and societal actors are l ikely to contest each other’s legitimacy, capacity and 
will  to protect disaster victims—for instance, by accusing government authorities of 
not letting members of an ethnic minority into flood shelters. 
 
Authoritarian LIC settings present specific challenges  for civil  society and 
international disaster responders. Authoritarian practices, defined as “patterns of 
action that sabotage accountability to people over whom a political actor exerts  
control, or their representatives, by means of secrecy, disinformation and disabling 
voice” (Glasius 2018, 517), translate into restrictions on information, right to 
expression and to assembly. MSF has reported state restrictions on “geographic 
access, programmatic options, and modalities of work” in the authoritarian contexts 
of Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Myanmar (del Valle and Healy 2013, 
S198). In Ethiopia, civil society and international actors have described their inability 
to freely shape aid provision because of the governmental “iron cage of 
bureaucracy” and restricted civil  society space (Desportes, Mandefro, and Hilhorst 
2019, 19). Humanitarian independence is put to the test when LIC dynamics enter 
into the disaster response process and question the impartiality of aid delivery, but 
this cannot be openly discussed under strict state control (Desportes, Mandefro, and 
Hilhorst 2019). For instance in Myanmar, for decades following the 1960s, and also 
more recently during the Rohingya crisis, organisations, journalists, researchers and 
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activists who wrote critically about the regime were blacklisted, ba nned or 
imprisoned (Selth 2018).  
Focusing on the practicalities of doing academic fieldwork in authoritarian contexts, 
Glasius et al. (2018) highlight the sense of uncertainty prevalent under authoritarian 
regimes. The uncertainty applies to both sides: the state is unsure about the extent 
of popular legitimacy and regime robustness; society is bewildered by many, 
contradictory and not always consistently applied laws (Glasius et al. 2018, 9). 
Glasius et al. (2018) stress the arbitrariness of state decisions and the context-
specific ‘fluid l ines ’ that make what is permissible ambiguous. This certainly applies 
to humanitarian action. In addition to the ‘big politics’ that may clearly restrict access 
or operations, seemingly softer ‘everyday politics’ unfold (Kerkvliet 2009, 232), and 
the quiet, mundane practices of state bureaucracy can restrict aid permissions in 
more duplicitous ways. A travel authorisation being held up by ‘bureaucratic delays’ 
would be more difficult to contest on humanitarian grounds than would a clear 
refusal to grant access to an area. The functioning of mostly opaque state institutions 
(Debiel and Klein 2002) adds uncertainty, as do LIC dynamics. High tensions between 
ethnic, religious and/or societal groups and the state increase the risk of arbitrary 
‘snap decisions’ and unpredictable eruptions of violence (Azar 1990; Galtung 1996; 
Kalyvas 2003). Non-governmental actors thus do not only adapt operations because 
of state-imposed limitations; the same actors also internalise self-censorship 
practices because of fear of over-stepping the fluid l ines or escalating tensions  
(Desportes, Mandefro, and Hilhorst 2019).  
 
Whether actors choose to self-censor or to act and speak out depends partially on 
their “actor pedigree” (Douma and Hilhorst 2006; Schennink et al. 2006). For 
example, denouncing a breach of humanitarian principles better fits the institutional 
model, mandate and habitus of the privately funded and testimony-oriented INGO 
MSF11 than that of the domestic National Red Cross Red Crescent Society, which is 
legally auxiliary to the state. Which risks can be taken also depends on actors ’ 
capacity to “disentangle themselves from confining structures, plot their escape and 
move towards better positions” (Vigh 2009, 419). Detail ing what he refers to as social 
navigation processes, Vigh (2009) draws a parallel with Jackson’s (1998) concept of 
                                                                 
11 MSF has come to be associated with the figure of the humanitarian who witnesses and denounces 
human suffering, in line with a human rights based humanitarian approach (Décobert 2016, 21; Fassin 
2007). 
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‘manoeuvring’, the striving for balance and control. Social  navigation directs the 
analytical gaze not towards structures and boundaries actors face, or how they act 
in their social environment, but rather towards how actors “interact with their social 
environment and adjust their l ives to the constant influence […] of social forces and 
change” (Vigh 2009, 433). As such, social navigation is a good fit for understanding 
the daily practices of actors seeking to reach a specific goal (here, minority support), 
in a context of restrictive and uncertain space to manoeuvre. 
 
5.2.1 Civil society actors 
Previous studies show civil  society actors to be particularly skilled social navigators. 
In Myanmar, the phrase ‘civil  society’ is generally used to denote “any group or 
initiative that is not directly piloted by the government” and aims to advance 
common interests (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2009, 6; Desaine 2011, 12 –
13). CSOs can be divided into community-based organisations (CBOs), primarily 
l inked to a specific ethnic or religious group, and the more Wes tern-oriented, 
officially registered local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs). Civil  society 
actors are deeply embedded in and knowledgeable about the dynamics of the area 
where they operate. CSOs in Myanmar have accumulated decades of experience 
responding to “conflict, oppressive structures, and […] disaster through self-
organisation, self-protection, and covert resistance” (Matelski 2016b, 24).  
 
In Myanmar, “ethnic identity […] is complex, politically charged and highly 
determinant of people’s personal and political identities and 
associations/affil iations” (Drew 2016, 8). Ethnicity and religion moreover constitute 
prime fault l ines of civil  society (Matelski 2016b). In situations of conflict and 
repression, minority group boundaries generally become more salient, reinforcing 
within-group loyalty and altruism (Flanigan, Asal, and Brown 2015, 1793). Local 
embeddedness also generates the ties of trust with communities necessary for aid 
operations ’ “access, cover and legitimacy” (Wallis and Jacquet 2011). However, CSOs 
being caught in their own web of “ethnic proximity, socio-political affi liation or local 
pressure” can also impede the impartial delivery of aid (Zyck and Krebs 2015, 3). 
 
Desaine (2011, 8) explains the prevalence of CSOs in Myanmar’s ethnic States and 
among minority religions, noting that they are “most l ikely to find operational space 
in marginal areas, where the Bamar prevailing state and its symbols have less 
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presence”. Based on existing l iterature, it seems that Myanmar CSOs rely upon two 
major social navigation strategies. The first is the long-term decision making that 
shapes an organisation’s pedigree, operating from outside or inside the country, and 
more or less formally (Desaine 2011). Some organisations balance formalisation’s 
advantages (e.g. ability to receive international funding as a registered LNGO) and  
disadvantages (e.g. obligation to submit programmes and budgets to government 
scrutiny) by engaging in partnerships. For example, CSOs not registered as LNGOs 
can retain independence and flexibil ity while also accessing a legal status and 
(Western) funds via participation in larger national or international umbrella 
organisations (Wallis and Jacquet 2011). Second, on a case-by-case basis, civil society 
actors adapt “their terminology, their visibility, and sometimes their actual activities 
to the limitations posed by central and local authorities ” (Matelski 2016b, 178–179). 
How this is done depends on the “the context of the moment, connections 
with/protection from the government, location and degree of sensitivity of the 
work” (Desaine 2011, 19). Civil  society actors are well versed in the ‘politics of 
silence’, influencing decisions not through direct confrontation, but by “remaining 
low profile” (Desaine 2011, 7).  
 
5.2.2 International humanitarian actors 
International humanitarian actors add to the complexity of governance. In Myanmar, 
the “decade-long conflict over the legitimacy of competing socio-political and armed 
actors” intermingles with “the evolving agendas and priorities of international 
players” through “politics, money, and power” (Décobert 2016, 6). These factors play 
out, for instance, when authoritarian states refuse international assistance, as 
initially occurred when cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar in 2008 (Alles 2012; 
Selth 2008). Paik (2011) details how authoritarian regimes balance political need and 
risk regarding accepting foreign aid and, if accepted, the degree of government 
control exerted over the movement of foreign aid workers and resources. In the 
Nargis response, foreign aid was eventually allowed “selectively and reluctantly” and 
was mostly distributed via government channels; Western rescue and medical staff 
and many vessels carrying relief goods were turned away at Myanmar’s border (Paik 
2011, 450, 455).   
 
International actors ranging from the UN to INGOs have long been reticent to take a 
stand on governments ’ treatment of minorities (Gaay Fortman 2006, 35). Taking 
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such a stand in regimes that perceive cultural heterogeneity as a threat to political 
unity and stability would be especially l ikely to raise tensions  (Koenig and 
Guchteneire 2007). The move towards a multicultural understanding of the nation-
state and the emergence of an international human rights regime led to  new 
repertoires of contention and claim making, enabling humanitarian actors and other 
governments to legitimately challenge national governments  (Koenig and 
Guchteneire 2007). Stil l , engaging on minority issues can be a double-edged sword. 
Referring to Myanmar, Taylor (1982, 7) argues that “ethnic politics is the obverse of 
the politics of national unity” when conflicts around socio-economic issues are 
increasingly framed as ethnic. 
 
The new repertoires of contention and claim making regarding minorities have 
hardly permeated disaster-related policy and practice. Disaster practitioners still  
portray themselves as apolitical and technical —partly to facil itate access and 
operations (Peters 2017). Harvey (2013) asserts that, although humanitarians often 
take cover behind humanitarian principles to avoid engaging with states in conflict 
settings, an increasing number of frameworks and guidelines highlight the primary 
responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from and following disasters, and 
supportive role of international actors in the process . Disaster policy documents  
mention a need to focus on the most vulnerable or marginalised and indigenous 
populations.12 However, demands such as the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in 
disaster risk reduction and response programmes are mostly apolitical, based on a 
romanticised depiction of indigenous peoples as interwoven with nature (Hilhorst et 
al. 2015). Issues such as exploitation or rights violations, which can contribute to 
disaster vulnerability and marginalisation during the response, are largely neglected. 
 
It is uncertain how similar social navigation options are for international 
humanitarians and civil society actors. In the authoritarian contexts of Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, del Valle and Healy (2013, 189) concluded that, for MSF, 
“successful access negotiations hinged heavily on demonstrating added value 
(medical relevance) while simultaneously building relationships with authorities […] 
and hoping that such measures could promote a level of acc eptance or trust needed 
to operate”. One would expect international humanitarians’ navigation routes to be 
                                                                 
12 For example, in the Sendai UN Disaster Risk Reduction Framework for Action (UNISDR 2015) and the 
UN agenda on indigenous peoples and disasters (UNISDR 2008). 
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more limited, given the ability of authorities to control ‘external agents ’ through 
visas, travel authorisations and other procedures. The steady trend towards the 
rationalisation and coordination of humanitarian action since the 1990s can also 
l imit options (Duffield 1997). Today, standards and blueprint institutional structures 
are largely applied across countries. Aiming to increase transparency and  
accountability, the standardisation “largely reflect[s] the concerns, priorities and 
values of technical professionals in Northern agencies ”; this leaves l ittle room for co-
shaping programmes with in-country humanitarian partners or adapting to complex 
humanitarian situations  (Dufour et al. 2004, 124). Although INGOs often choose to 
fit into this ‘standardised’ humanitarian system, many remain more flexible 
regarding funding and decision making (Davey, Borton, and Foley 2013; Lyons 2014).  
 
In Myanmar, prior to the democratisation process starting in 2011, international 
actors were known for a fixed, polarised stance in an “internationalised battle of 
legitimacies”  (Décobert 2016, 8), either judging it more effective to engage 
constructively with the government or preferring to operate cross -border, informally 
and/or via CSOs (Décobert 2016; Duffield 2008). Desaine (2011) argues that 
international actors perceived LNGOs as systematically opposed to the (semi-
)military regime and always on the side of good. This chapter will  examine how these 
dynamics had evolved by 2015. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
 
This chapter is based on primary data collected during a four-month period 
(September 2017–February 2018) in Yangon and Chin State. During the fieldwork, 
restrictions and intense violence described by the UN as  “very l ikely” ethnic cleansing 
of the Rohingya (Trihartono 2018; UN 2018, 8) made access to Rakhine State 
impossible and increased distrust towards outsiders interested in humanitarian 
issues. This also hampered access to some Yangon-based organisations deeply 
involved in the crisis, especially those I suspected of relying on more ‘informal’ 
methods. However, disaster response processes could be reconstructed through 
conversations with approachable Yangon-based practitioners who had been directly 
involved in the 2015 cyclone response in Rakhine and/or Chin State, as decision 
makers based in offices or on the ground. A 10-day trip to Hakha, the landslide-
impacted capital of Chin State, allowed direct observation and interaction with 
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actors in a minority area. The trip was largely spent with Hakha community members  
who had been displaced since 2015, CBO and LNGO employees, and INGO staff 
members who were involved in the 2015 response from their Asian regional  
headquarters.  
 
The data collection involved documented exchanges with a total of 71 participants, 
47 of whom participated in in-depth semi-structured interviews or focus group 
discussions. Interview participants were selected from key organisations involved in 
the 2015 response, as determined based on grey l iterature and referral sampling. 
The data collection focused on perceived minority marginalisation, challenges and 
social navigation strategies developed during the 2015 Komen response in Chin and 
Rakhine States, specifically in the strongly disaster-impacted townships of Hakha 
(the Chin State capital) and north of Sittwe (the Rakhine State ca pital) (outlined in 
blue in Figure 5.2). Although some depth is lost by detail ing processes in two areas 
instead of one, the comparison highlights the diversity of LIC and minority dynamics 
within a single-country context and enables a differentiated and layered account of 
social navigation strategies.  
 
Table 5.1. Overview of research participants per actor type in Myanmar. 
Actor type Number of 
participants* 
Civil society 
actors 
Community-based organisations 4 
Local  non-governmental organisations 7 
International 
humanitarian 
actors 
International non-governmental 
organisations 
9 
International organisations such as UN 
agencies 
7 
Humanitarian donors 4 
Independent international humanitarian 
consultant 
1 
Other Chin State government official 1 
Research institutions, local and foreign 4 
Res idents displaced by the 2015 Hakha 
landslide 
10 
Total 47 
* Participant numbers refer to in-depth individual interviews, except for displaced residents, who were 
focus group participants.  
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As shown in Table 5.1, I aimed to engage with a large variety of non-governmental 
actors. For instance, for civil  society actors, I approached members of more and less 
formalised organisations (LNGOs vs. CBOs), including those positioned closer to 
either international or ethnic/religious networks and those claiming to have a 
bridging role. During the Yangon-based interviews, trust and deeper insight were 
attained as participants first discussed less sensitive Chin State dynamics and then 
contrasted these with those in Rakhine. Additional data were collected from 
secondary sources (press clippings, humanitarian and CSO reports used for 
lobbying), through everyday observation and from casual conversations (e.g. during 
formal CSO meetings in Hakha and informal dinner discussions with humanitarian 
actors in Yangon). All  data were stored using NVIVO and analysed using both pre-
determined codes and codes derived through a thematic analytical process (Braun 
and Clarke 2006).   
 
 
Figure 5.2. Case study areas and 2015 flood-affected townships. Case study areas (framed in blue) and 
flood-affected areas (in red) compiled based on government and humanitarian sources on 3 August 2015  
(Author 2020 modified based on UN OCHA 2015a).  
 
Several fieldwork limitations affected the conclusions that could be drawn. The 2017 
escalation of tensions and violence among community groups and between 
humanitarian actors and the government may have influenced participants’ 
recollection of 2015 dynamics. The one interview with a government representative, 
who mostly recited government policies and questioned the rationale of my PhD 
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study and presence in Myanmar, indicated that minorities and even humanitarian 
support were topics too sensitive to discuss with such officials. Furthermore, the 
data certainly reflect participants’ personal trajectories. For example, statements on 
marginalisation must be treated with caution in a context where memories of human 
rights violations are stil l  fresh. Acknowledgement of relief coming from the 
government or military was rarely unprompted and often given grudgingly, as 
reflected in a statement made by a Hakha resident during a focus group discussion 
(#8, 22.11.2017): “Yes, the army provided tar for the road reconstruction. But l eave 
the military out of it. I don’t even want their money”. The subjectivity of framings 
and divergences among them are part of my findings and reflective of the broader 
LIC dynamics at play (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). 
 
5.4 Context 
 
In 2015, Myanmar experienced heavy monsoon rains, and cyclone Komen triggered 
landslides and the most widespread flooding in decades, leaving 125 dead and 
1,676,086 temporarily displaced (UN OCHA 2015a, 2015b). Cyclone Komen made 
landfall at a time of heightened Myanmar identity politics—a few months after four 
discriminatory ‘Race and Religion’ laws were passed and a few months before the 
tense November 2015 elections.  
 
In the broader context, a triple transition increased volatility and uncertainty for 
minorities, CSOs and international humanitarian actors. First, anti -minority and 
especially anti-Muslim attitudes rose to a level of explosive hatred and vengeance, 
not least on social media (Kipgen 2013; Wade 2017). Second, the partial democratic 
transition multiplied the institutional entry points among military and civilian 
institutions, both of which are present from the highest governance level, the Union 
government, to the township level (Sifton 2014). Third, the Myanmar aid system was 
overhauled. Myanmar jumped from lowest international aid beneficiary per capita 
in the region, with almost no aid going through the government, to 'donor darling’ 
status with the establishment of UN sectors, clusters, and permanent donor and 
INGO headquarters (Décobert 2016, 63). For the first time, the Myanmar Union 
government officially appealed for international cyclone support on 4 August 2015. 
The government then worked with staff dispatched from the United States ’ Federal 
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Emergency Management Agency in the newly operational  Crisis Management Unit 
in Myanmar’s capital of Nay Pyi Taw. 
 
Not all  local structures benefitted from the exponential  increase in international 
donor interest following Nargis  and the 2011 political l iberalisation process. Civil  
society actors had gained legitimacy following their mobilisation as sometimes sole 
responders to cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Desaine 2011; Selth 2008; South et al. 2011). 
Thousands of informal CSOs emerged, some officially registering as LNGOs when the 
process was facil itated in 2014 (LNGO #13, 22.01.2018). Matelski  (2016a, 117) 
highlights how Western funding has mostly reached state actors and the limited 
LNGOs considered sufficiently ‘professional’ and supportive of Western interests.  
 
Chin and Rakhine were the only two ethnic States declared disaster-affected zones 
by the Myanmar Union government because floods and landslides surpassed local 
response capacities (Zaw and Lim 2017, 2). Disaster impacts, LIC/minority tensions 
and humanitarian dynamics varied greatly between the two States. 
 
5.4.1 Chin State 
Bordering Rakhine State to the east and India to the north, Chin State was strongly 
hit by the 2015 floods but especially the landslides, which swept away fields, roads 
and bridges in mountainous areas. The Myanmar National Natural Disaster 
Management Committee (2015a) identified Hakha township as one of the five most 
affected townships nationwide. In Hakha town, entire neighbourhoods were wiped 
out, affecting 6,535 and displacing more than 4,254, according to an assessment by 
the CBO Chin Committee for Emergency Response and Rehabilitation (CCERR 2015, 
11).  
The Chin are a predominantly Christian religious group and have faced persecution 
in Myanmar. In Chin State, “the military has been accused of the destruction of 
churches and Christian symbols, of forced conversion to Buddhism, and of kil ling 
several Christian leaders” (Sakhong 2007 cited in Matelski 2016b, 65). Today, Chin 
State is considered the poorest and most remote State in Myanmar (UN 
Development Programme 2011). 13  The “state–subject relationship between the 
                                                                 
13 According to the Household Living Conditions Assessment survey conducted by the UN Development 
Programme (2011), approximately 73% of the Chin State population lives below the poverty line. Rakhine 
State has the second highest poverty rate in Myanmar, at 44%. 
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Chins and the Bamar state” has historically been distant (Mark 2016, 142). At the 
2013 Chin National Conference, Chin political and civil  society actors called for a 
stronger role for state government, involvement and consent of indigenous/ethnic 
minority groups, transparency and accountability, and more Chin political 
representation at Union level  (Mark 2016, 153).  
 
There is division among more than 50 different Chin ethnic sub-groups belonging to 
different Christian church denominations and in rarer cases also subscribing to 
Animism (Desaine 2011, 36). The limited presence of IOs and INGOs in this remote 
area is partly offset by extensive, mostly Christian, diaspora networks spanning the 
globe. Linkages among Chin communities and international Christian churches, 
Western advocacy groups and INGOs are strong, building on a tradition of British 
missionary and educational work and the colonial British preference to work with 
Christian organisations (Desaine 2011; Matelski 2016a, 95). In Myanmar, Christian 
organisations appear more visible compared with Buddhist organisations (Desaine 
2011, 13), and Christians are generally over-represented in CSOs (Heidel 2006). 
 
5.4.2 Rakhine State 
On the most western edge of Myanmar, the coastal Rakhine State was the first to be 
hit when cyclone Komen made landfall on 31 July 2015. Strong winds and rains 
caused landslides and extensive flooding in eight townships, with  125,151 houses 
damaged and 217,246 acres of arable land destroyed. As of 2 September 2015, 
96,165 inhabitants of Rakhine State were stil l  displaced (Myanmar National Natural 
Disaster Management Committee 2015b).  
 
The five townships situated north of the State capital of Sittwe were also the theatre 
of the 2012 intercommunal  violence that kil led hundreds and displaced 140,000. 
Detail ing the historical and politico-military context of the Rakhine border with 
Bangladesh, Farzana (2015, 296) refers to the area as in “continual disorder” since 
the 1784 local rebellion against Burmese invasion. 14  In 2015, tensions were high 
among diverse ethnic and religious  groups: Buddhists of sometimes Bamar but 
predominantly Rakhine ethnicity; socio-economically weaker Muslims, historically 
                                                                 
14 The policies enforced by subsequent regimes, from the British colonial ‘divide-and-rule’ to Myanmar 
government policies of exclusion and ethnicisation, have reinforced ethnic boundaries around the 
numerous and diverse population groups (Farzana 2015). 
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deprived of economic opportunities and of “political rights and opportunity of 
service in the government, ministries, directorates, departments, corporations, 
judiciary, education and local administrative councils” (Parnini 2013, 286); and other 
minorities lacking political representation. The last group includes a few thousand 
Rakhine residents of Chin ethnicity (CCERR 2015). The approximately one million 
Rakhine-based Rohingya are among the most marginalised minorities in Southeast 
Asia. They have faced intense human rights violations at the hands of the population 
and the Myanmar military (Farzana 2015; Kipgen 2013). When cyclone Komen 
struck, 140,000 Rohingya were stil l  housed in camps for internally displaced  persons 
(IDPs) (European Civil  Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 2015).   
 
Together with conflict-ridden Kachin, northern Rakhine State has the highest 
presence of international humanitarian actors outside of Yangon. A few international 
organisations have carried out cross -border operations since the 1980s, but not 
without challenges. MSF France decided to withdraw from the region and country in 
2004, as changing regulations hampered organisations ’ freedom of movement and 
work. That same year, the ICRC was forced to suspend activities (Currie 2012, 26; 
International Crisis Group 2006, 8).  An international Rakhine humanitarian cluster 
was established in Sittwe after violence flared up in 2012, also impacting the 
Western staff of international humanitarian organisations. Many aid organisations 
chose to call  their Western staff back from Rakhine to minimise safety risks or were 
forced to leave by the government, as was the case for MSF Holland (Matelski 2016b, 
243). The Organisation for Islamic Cooperation was never authorised to provi de 
post-2012 support in Myanmar—a decision backed by Buddhist demonstrators  
(British Broadcasting Corporation 2012). Accusations of bias from residents of 
Rakhine ethnicity towards  ‘Western organisations ’ were not unfounded. The CDA 
Collaborative Learning Projects (2009, 10) highlight how the Rohingya were 
“considerably more likely” to receive support from INGOs and IOs, whereas Buddhist 
ethnic Rakhines were more likely to receive support from the government. This 
report thus concluded that foreign aid played into the local conflict dynamics. 
Concerning civil  society actors, Desaine (2011, 38) mentions a void of LNGOs in 
northern Rakhine and an increasing presence of LNGOs “based on Buddhist 
charitable pillars” in southern Rakhine. 
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5.5 Findings: Socially navigating towards minorities 
 
For both States, this section details) how participants perceived minorities to be 
marginalised in the government response and the disaster response of civil society 
and international actors, including the challenges they faced. Social navigation 
strategies are also presented for the actor group most instrumental in  providing 
relief to minorities in that State. 
 
5.5.1 Chin State 
 
A marginalising government response? 
Community participants and civil society actors approached in Hakha and Yangon 
accused the Union government of neglect, both in interviews and official 
publications. One report issued by a CBO (CCERR 2015) argued that, although Chin 
State is the poorest in Myanmar and among the hardest hit by the 2015 floods and 
landslides, only 4% of Myanmar Union flood relief funding went to the state. 
Additionally, the state government’s coordination efforts, which were described as 
corrupt, following the whims of the Union capital and mostly employing non -Chins, 
were deemed late and disappointing. In Hakha, government relief reportedly  
reached only 2000–3000 people; there was a “difference in thousands” between the 
counts of people impacted provided by the General Administration Department and 
by CBOs and LNGOs (LNGO #2, 23.11.2017). One CBO participant (#2, 17.01.2018) 
stressed that government control is only problematic  when the response deviates 
from the “moral contract” of fair and transparent aid distribution. In Hakha, poorer  
households, for instance, did not qualify for governmental disaster support because 
they did not l ive in formally registered housing. Furthermore, Union government 
relief shipped to government warehouses was not distributed to victims (LNGO  #2, 
23.11.2017; CBO #3, 23.11.2017). In September 2018, a CBO statement publically 
denounced the wasting of aid and the General Administration Department for 
keeping the remaining disaster relief funds (CCERR 2018).  
 
Research participants debated whether the discrepancy between actual  needs and 
what the government provided was caused only by logistical difficulties of getting 
aid to the remote Chin mountains, where there was no airport and roads had been 
destroyed by the storm—as advanced by several humanitarian actors and the 
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government official (#1, 23.11.2017)—or whether this discrepancy was  also a 
manifestation of the ‘double C curse’, reflecting marginalisation for being Chin and 
Christian. The latter explanation was supported by all  Chin participants and by 
Myanmar non-Chin INGO representatives. According to a Chin-based LNGO 
representative (#14, 19.01.2018), “some say there was discrimination [and] that 
government response was limited because we are Christians. The government said 
in the news [that] they were giving out bags of rice, but that was only in the news ”.  
 
A thin international response 
The above accusations of marginalisation were dismissed by a few foreign 
participants, including one who had worked for a Chin LNGO (#2, 25.10.2017). 
Yangon-based humanitarians operating country-wide emphasised that responding 
in Chin State was not the highest priority and was very difficult logistically (IO  #3, 
7.11.2017). Only actors with a permanent presence in Hakha (a few larger IOs and 
one INGO) provided direct support, mainly in government-regulated IDP camps. 
Their support through hygiene, education and non-food items was welcomed by 
Chin-based LNGOs, CBOs and residents. A representative of a Christian INGO that 
channelled funds through like-minded faith-based LNGOs recounted difficulties in 
obtaining travel authorisations from the Union government for monitoring visits 
(INGO #2, 20.11.2017). 
 
An overwhelmingly civil society response for minorities 
Especially CBOs, but also a few internationally funded Christian LNGOs, were the 
primary responders  in Hakha township. One LNGO director (#2, 23.11.2017) 
reported channelling some of their funding to a CBO because they had “lots of 
connections and cooperate with civil  society”. There were rumours that funds 
sourced through the Chin diaspora and Christian networks surpassed the 
government’s relief budget, but it proved difficult to obtain exact numbers.  
 
However substantial, the civil  society response should not be romanticised. Several 
CSO participants accused major Hakha-based CBO networks of lacking accountability 
and channelling resources to their own ethnic  sub-groups, churches or geographical 
areas. This was stated in two independent focus group discussions with displaced 
Hakha residents. Among many examples, res idents recounted how a Hakha-based 
Christian association used donations to buy buses for their own use (resident #6, 
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22.11. 2017). They were particularly disappointed with a locally established 
committee founded to coordinate the civil society response in Hakha, which had, 
they felt, mismanaged the process:  
 
They only gave materials later, when they were rotten. Decaying. We only 
got one-third of the donated materials. […] They only recently publicised 
how much money they collected, but it was not clear where that went, and 
we could not ask any questions. (Resident #3, 22.11.2017) 
 
Few strict governmental restrictions seemed to apply to CBOs: many had not 
registered as organisations until months after the initial relief phase. Stil l, CSOs faced 
three main challenges: everyday delays ; blockages in mobilising international aid 
funds; and the risk of increasing tensions over aid distribution decisions.  
 
Concerning the first challenge, civil society actors accused the government of 
hampering their initiatives. CBOs not fulfi l ling specific criteria were initially excluded 
from emergency meetings coordinated by the state government, until  it became 
clear how much funding civil  society could contribute (LNGO  #2, 23.11.2017). 
Additional examples i l lustrate authorities ’ power to block, delay or raise the costs of 
relief activities for Chin State. Aid supplies from the Royal Thai Air Force were 
diverted to a Bamar-dominated area outside of Chin State by the Union government 
(CBO #2, 17.01.2018). Additional ly, as relief goods collected by the Chin diaspora 
transited through Yangon airport, the Union government levied high taxes, searched 
the goods and kept them in customs for two weeks (LNGO #14, 19.01.2018).  
 
Second, CBOs and LNGOs without ties to Christia n INGOs reported difficulty 
mobilising funding through the newly ‘rationalised’ humanitarian system. CSOs 
previously had privileged relations with their “own traditional donors, INGOs which 
[they] worked closely with”, but they now had to “rely more and more on 
institutional donors” with intensive procedures and requirements. This was 
described by all  LNGOs and even international aid actors with longer experience in 
the country as hampering responses that were, in the words  of one LNGO 
representative, “quick, flexible” and sometimes also “conflict-sensitive” (#6, 
10.01.2018). According to a CBO representative (#2, 21.11.2017), the UN agencies 
they hoped to engage with judged them as too blunt on the topic of minority 
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marginalisation: “The [IO] once told us […], do not talk so critical [or else] people will  
hate you and you will  not succeed. Try to be positive. But a CSO ’s role is to make 
noise”. The CBO wished to advocate for more minority support, but that was 
perceived as biased by the humanitarian organisations. 
 
Third, distributing relief without raising tensions among the more than 50 different 
sub-ethnic and religious groups was considered challenging. An LNGO director (#14, 
19.01.2018) often had to counter accusations of ethnic bias because her organisation 
was named after her area of origin. A CBO representative (#2, 17.01.2018) accused 
faith-based groups of using the distribution of Chin diaspora funds for 
evangelisation, especially in southern Chin, where Christian, Buddhist and Animist 
groups coexist. 
 
Civil society actors’ navigation strategies  
Civil  society actors chose from or combined two main routes to navigate the above 
challenges: activating minority networks and trying to play the government and the 
internationally led relief system. 
 
Civil society strategy 1: Activating minority networks  
Large amounts of funding and supplies came from neighbouring areas with similar 
minority backgrounds, far from Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon, the power centres of the 
Union government and the international humanitarian system. Cars transporting 
relief goods donated by the predominantly Christian Indian state of Mizoram and the 
Kachin ‘brothers and sisters ’ who share a similar ethnic background are not ‘i l legal’ 
per se, but l ie within a grey zone of informal practice. As put by a Hakha resident, 
they “tasted Indian rice first”, before supplies from Nay Pyi Taw reached them, if 
they ever did (#4, 22.11.2017). To minimise tensions among the different Chin ethnic 
sub-groups, the Kachin group channelli ng resources asked for those resources to be 
divided equally among all Chin townships. A CBO actor (#2, 23 .11.2017) criticised this 
practice, claiming it was unfair to the most affected townships.  
 
Charismatic individuals and their personal networks  were instrumental in mobilising 
funds outside the formal humanitarian system. For instance, one donor (#4, 
1.02.2018) reported how a CBO bypassed his organisation to receive funding directly 
from his government’s national treasury, using existing ties between a  respected 
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Chin individual and a parliamentarian in that foreign country. Less attached to 
regulations and conditions, this funding could quickly reach Chin communities. 
Another case involved a Chin LNGO leader (#14, 19.01.2018) who used a trip to 
attend a wedding in the United States for fundraising in churches and Chin diaspora 
communities, raising thousands of US dollars. Civil society actors also lobbied and 
tried to mobilise support via the diaspora press, deemed more independent than the 
in-country press (LNGO #2, 23.11.2017).  
 
Civil society strategy 2: Playing the humanitarian system  
Chin actors generated their own evidence to question the validity of the government 
and humanitarian disaster response. A Chin-based CBO (#2, 17.01.2018) collected 
data on disaster impacts and response, co-forming an extensive network of data-
collection partners across communities. The results of this  community impact 
assessment were presented at Yangon press conferences and a Nay Pyi Taw 
Humanitarian Country Team meeting. This demonstrates the extent of time and 
energy devoted to lobbying humanitarian decision makers, who control  growing 
amounts of aid funding. These decision makers can also ‘validate’ and ‘legitimate’ 
minorities ’ plight by directing funds to them. International actors seemed to notice 
these efforts; several humanitarians referred to Chin CSOs as “vocal” and “mobilised 
in complaining” (e.g. IO #3, 7.11.2017).  
 
Whom to approach with what information and how to do this were ca refully 
considered. Sometimes, the follow-up moves of approached actors were predicted 
in a chess-like manner. The question of why the above Chin-based CBO did not 
directly lobby Nay Pyi Taw authorities with their own needs assessment report 
yielded an intricate answer:  
 
The government makes the decision but especially the UN provides them 
with information and support [through] resources. We cannot approach the 
government so much, so we go via the UN. In the end, the government 
decides. So we constantly observe the government—what they do, what 
happens. The UN can influence the government […] They took our data. We 
showed them our community data and the government data, and the 
difference between both. (CBO #2, 17.01.2018)  
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The above-mentioned report included detailed comparative tables, graphs and “lots 
of footnotes for the donors” (academic #1, who edited the report, 6.11.2017). 
Speaking the language of the humanitarian system was a strategy for playing this 
system. CSOs strategically self-branded and adapted their discourse to suit their 
targets. For example, one CBO (#2, 17.01.2018) spelled out the ‘C’ in their 
organisational acronym as ‘Chin’ or ‘Community’, depending on whether they were 
engaging with the Chin diaspora or the UN. Taking self-framing to the individual level, 
an INGO official (#9, 5.01. 2018) of Chin ethnicity but with a Bamar-sounding name 
reported disclosing her ethnic origin only when it was advantageous.  
 
CBOs strategically appealed to all ies who could help them reach international  
audiences, such as the US academic who helped compile the Chin community data 
report or the “good influential UN guy” who could be “grab[bed]” to lobby in high-
level humanitarian meetings (CBO #2, 17.01.2018). I met several ‘free-floating’ 
foreigners who brokered linkages between civil  society and international actors. 
5.5.2 Rakhine State 
 
A marginalising government response 
Similar to the situation in Chin State, the 14.7% of Union relief funds allocated to 
Rakhine State was deemed insufficient given the large-scale coastal devastation 
(CBO #2, 17.01.2018). Statements made in interviews  and in print (CCERR 2015; 
European Civil  Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 2015)  identified 
additional intra-state marginalisation in the government response. Firs t, locally 
powerful people such as township administrators channelled aid towards their own 
non-minority community groups (CBO #2, 17.01.2018; donor #3, 29.01.2018). 
Second, relief modalities that might have been unproblematic in less  divided settings 
further marginalised minorities. For instance, relief cash grants ended up in the 
hands of the local market owners, government regulations forbade Muslim 
contractors from participating in public infrastructure reconstruction, and 
government and sometimes IO relief was distributed from monasteries, l imiting non-
Buddhists ’ access (donor #4, 1.02.2018; CBO #2, 17.02. 2018). Third, isolated cases 
of severe minority marginalisation were reported. For example, an IO official (#5, 
11.01.2018) mentioned that the relocation of Muslim flood victims in “military 
vehicles” was “not always done voluntarily”. 
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A thin civil society response for the most marginalised minorities 
Another layer of marginalisation was the obstruction of self-help and local relief 
initiatives for minorities. Marginalised and vulnerable minorities had less capacity to 
cope and self-organise because of their lower economic and social position and 
limited rights. Rohingya disaster victims in government IDP camps denied freedom 
of movement are an extreme example (European Civil  Protection and Humanitarian 
Aid Operations 2015). Concerning CBO and LNGO support to Muslim groups, and 
especially to the Rohingya, organisations with Muslim ties were not allowed to 
operate. I could find only one Muslim faith-based organisation, which was operating 
in an IDP camp without a formal memorandum of understanding (MoU). The 
government would not provide a MoU, but the group felt that operating under such  
conditions yielded certain advantages: flexibility, reacti vity, the ability to spend 
funds received from mostly Muslim (sometimes diaspora) philanthropists worldwide 
in a timely way, and less scrutiny—as long as their privileged relationship with the 
local authorities continued and the government saw benefit in having a “token 
Muslim organisation” operating (INGO# 1, 10.10.2017).  
CSOs without Muslim ties were largely unwill ing to assist Muslims. Several INGOs, 
IOs and donors who would have liked to dispatch aid via local implementing partners 
described Rakhine-based CBOs and LNGOs as “not principled”. One INGO 
representative (#17, 23.01.2017) stated, “I prefer a localised response, but this 
context really needs the international hand to make sure the vulnerable people are 
targeted”. Indeed, of all  the CSOs I approached, only one staff member of a Chin-
based CBO primarily supporting Rakhine residents of Chin ethnicity said that she 
personally would have liked to also support Muslims including the Rohingya, but that 
it was too risky for her organisation: 
 
We speak on behalf of other minority groups. But with Muslims it is tricky 
on the ground […] even if I personally also feel for the Rohingya. But if you 
are in a dangerous situation […] between the tiger and the snake, you have 
to be careful. Limits exist even for [our organisation]. (CBO #2, 17.11.2017)  
 
An overwhelmingly international response for the most marginalised 
minorities 
Assistance for Muslim groups, the most marginalised minorities in Rakhine, was 
generally international. International humanitarian actors faced four broad 
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challenges: stigmatisation and security risks, government control, uncertainty and 
manipulation.  
 
At organisational and individual staff levels, disaster responders feared 
stigmatisation and security repercussions of supporting Rakhine Muslims after the 
2015 disasters, as an IO representative mentioned: “In Rakhine, everyone is poor. It 
is true the Muslims are often worse off, but working only for them is a suicide 
mission” (IO #10, 30.01.2018). One INGO representative (#17, 23.01.2018) described 
how the movement of every aid convoy passing through host communities and any 
effort to resettle Rohingya groups somewhere with better facil ities were scrutinised, 
including by non-Rohingya Muslim communities. Agencies providing relief to 
Muslims were criticised in public demonstrations and on social media, sometimes 
including the names and photos of staff members, who were themselves labelled 
‘terrorists ’ for helping ‘Muslim terrorists ’. In this context, the figure of the ‘inpat’ 
emerged: Burmese INGO or IO staff members who had outsider status and faced 
stigmatisation from their own community for supporting an ethnic or religious group 
other than their own in a LIC-divided society.  
Concerning engagement with government structures, several participants 
mentioned government restrictions or conditions they had to satisfy, such as the 
impossibility of working wi th ‘non-citizen’ Rohingya disaster volunteers or staff 
(INGO #16, 21.01.2018), and limited access to Rohingya IDP camps (INGO #1, 
10.10.2017). International humanitarian actors depend on various government 
authorities for permits, MoUs for programme activities and travel authorisations. 
Humanitarians deemed it dangerous to denounce their lack of independence. An 
INGO official (#17, 22.01.2018) admitted that “our organisation is usually a loud 
organisation […] but here we never participate in a shout”.  
 
Uncertainty about navigating complex government structures also emerged. Many 
foreign aid workers described feeling “overwhelmed” by shifting governance 
structures and mandates . Some regulations continued to apply, such as getting 
authorisation from the vil lage tract authorities, which are part of the military -led 
General Administration Department. However, with the political transition, entry 
points multiplied, calling for “lots of negotiations, all  the time, with a lot of different 
dynamics” (IO#2, 10.10.2018). Authorities under central civil ian and military 
leadership and parallel ethnic State and Union structures operate at different 
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governance levels, often without communicating with each other —for instance 
about authorisations granted to humanitarian actors. Government authorities 
operate informally and unpredictably, fail ing to record agreements (donor  #4, 
1.02.2018) and switching travel authorisations on and off, thus  hampering planning 
(INGO #4, 18.10.2017). Organisations’ assessments of how the political transition 
impacted their room for manoeuvre differed and, as i l lustrated by the following 
quotation from a Burmese staff member of an INGO with a broader mandate, they 
criticised organisations with different approaches: “Some humanitarian actors here 
act as if nothing has changed. They stil l  think the military is in control. They hide 
some of their activities. They lie. We are honest. We have nothing to hide, and it 
works” (#11, 10.01.2018). 
 
Finally, several participants described the government’s ‘double game’. Officially, 
government authorities were not receptive to demands for more minority support. 
The Rohingya’s very identity was negated in government discourse, where their 
name is never mentioned. However, behind the scenes, authorities pushed IOs and 
INGOs to cater to Muslims only. An IO official characterised this as a political 
manipulation tactic:  
So often the government says ‘No, no, we will  be giving to the Rakhine 
community. And you do it for the Muslim community’. That was the big 
issue from the beginning. We are then perceived as the bad […] Nobody in 
this country is interested in [being well perceived] by the Rohingya. They do 
not count. It is not an audience [anyone is] interested in. They are interested 
in communicating the message that they take care of the Rakhine, and 
mostly the Bamar […] So it is a political manipulation. (IO #3, 7.11.2017). 
 
Manipulating international humanitarian actors to help only Muslims dates back at 
least to the 2012 inter-communal violence. After organisations asked to help both 
Buddhist and Muslim victims, “the government said ok to both, but granted 
authorisation for helping the Muslims first, and the other [authorisation] never 
came” (donor #4, 1.02.2018). 
 
International actors’ navigation strategies  
The strategies of two outlier disaster response actors channelling relief to minorities 
in Rakhine (the CBO channelling relief mainly towards Chins  through ethnic and 
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religious networks and the Muslim INGO operating without a MoU) were detailed 
above. Otherwise, international humanitarians described four  main strategies for 
navigating Rakhine-specific challenges: targeting choices, perception management, 
approaching and distancing themselves from other actors, and financial incentives 
to involve CSOs.  
 
These strategies derived from monitoring, as closely as possible, the situation on the 
ground, other humanitarian actors’ operations, and wider social and political trends 
in Myanmar society (for instance concerning the discourse surrounding the 
Rohingya). Inter-communal and humanitarian dynamics across  neighbouring 
Buddhist, Muslim and Muslim-IDP communities are highly complex even within a 
single Rakhine township, as visible on the drawings (see Figures 5.3) made by an 
INGO official (#17, 22.1.2017) and CBO member (#2, 17.1.2017) as they were 
explaining the rationale behind their targeting strategies to me.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Inter-communal dynamics in a Rakhine township as drawn by an INGO member (#17, 
22.01.2018) and by a CBO member (#2, 17.01.2017, right-hand side). 
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International strategy 1: Setting a course via targeting 
In the LIC setting of Rakhine, selecting disaster victims to help (i.e. targeting) was 
presented as key to humanitarians’ acceptance by host communities and the wider 
public, although the choice is not the organisation ’s alone, as the above statements 
concerning government manipulation highlighted. Two opposing logics  stood out 
and are here referred to using the terminology commonly used by the participants: 
‘50/50’ vs. ‘needs-based’.  
 
Each participant framed her/his organisation’s targeting strategy as the most 
conflict-sensitive. Often, the strategy also fit the organisation’s pedigree. The ‘50/50’ 
strategy meant providing exactly the same amount of the same goods to antagonistic 
community groups, regardless  of need. This was considered the only viable solution 
to l imit tensions by many participants, but was dismissed as “the 50/50 trap” (e.g. IO 
#10, 30.01.2018) by others. Likewise, the ‘needs-based approach’, which refers to 
the humanitarian principle of impartiality, was defended by some participants and 
discarded as “utterly naïve” in the tense context by others. 
 
International strategy 2: Hoisting the right flags  
It is not only important what an actor does (e.g. their targeting strategy), but also 
how their actions are perceived by various antagonistic  audiences: “It is about 
[perception] balances. Of course, at the next level, tensions are also manipulated” 
(INGO #17, 22.01.2018). A few participants criticised perception management 
sometimes taking precedence over intrinsic activity rationales: “Some do activities 
to gain acceptance. Ok, let’s get acceptance. What can we do?” (IO #10, 30.01.2018).  
 
All  participants closely monitored the views circulating about their organisation and 
relief activities. That was especially the case on social media, where stories  can 
rapidly be distorted and go viral. One such story was  the ‘mosque story’: An IO (#10, 
30.01.2018) discovered that it was being harshly criticised online for “funding 
mosques” in Rakhine as part of the response. The IO immediately dispatched field 
staff, finding that  
 
vil lage elders had asked each cash grant beneficiary to give 10% [of their 
grant] for the mosque reconstruction. We went back and explained to them 
that this is not [how the funds should be used] […] [To prevent such 
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situations], you have to be proactive concerning rumours and allegations  
[…] It can quickly turn against you.  
 
In addition to close monitoring, actors dedicated significant effort to self-framing and 
communicating about their relief work in the field, in print and online. One IO15 asked 
for its logo to be removed from the UN multi-actor flood relief overview map, as it 
did not want to be associated with the domestically unpopular UN. A donor (#4, 
1.02.2018), despite agreeing overall  that it was disadvantageous to be visible in 
northern Rakhine, thought it would benefit his organisation to foreground precisely 
their ‘neutral’ flood relief activities through a one-page report, local media and a 
press release. Larger INGOs and IOs all have visibil ity guidelines ,16 and two important 
donors (#3, 24.01.2018; #4, 1.02.2018) highlighted perception management as a 
core discussion point with the agencies they funded.  
Concerning the Rohingya, organisations learned to mirror the language of 
authorities, sometimes compromising on their own principles , such as here 
supporting the ‘”right to self-identification”:  
 
In 2015, we did not use the term ‘Rohingya’ […] If you want to have a 
conversation at all, you should use the same terms as the government, 
[‘Muslims ’ or ‘Bengalis ’] […] We consistently support the right of self-
identification, but in terms of relationship[s] with authorities […], if you 
actually want to achieve something, do not say ‘Rohingya’. (donor #4, 
1.02.2018) 
 
Myanmar staff members were considered better versed at adapting their behaviour 
and discourse. An IO staff member thus reported that, to negotiate with authorities, 
they “usually send the Myanmar staff; they know how to deal with authorities, with 
the strong state” (IO #10, 30.01.2018). 
 
International strategy 3: Navigating the actor networks  
Organisations with broader mandates including development or policy work 
presented their organisational pedigree as beneficial to relief operations. Long-term 
                                                                 
15 To maintain confidentiality, the participant identification number is not disclosed here.  
16 For example, no photos where aid workers’ faces are recognisable and no pre-election expressions of 
political affiliation are allowed. 
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engagement with members of parliament (INGO #11, 10.11.2017) or with Rakhine 
fishers (donor #4, 1.02.2018) resulted in networks and knowledge that were valuable 
for crisis moments. Pure humanitarian actors also strategically reached out to 
authorities who were “not essential” to their relief work, such as monastery leaders, 
to increase their acceptance (IO #10, 30.01.2018). 
 
Closed gatherings of humanitarian actors, such as the Rakhine cluster, where all  
operating INGOs and IOs met weekly in Sittwe, and the country-wide Humanitarian 
Country Team and INGO forum in Yangon, were presented as important for 
exchanging information, lobbying and advocating in a context where openly doing 
so alone is ineffective and possibly dangerous. The INGO representative (#5, 
11.01.2018) who mentioned cases of involuntary, military-assisted relocation of 
disaster-impacted Muslims in Rakhine was asked whether his organisation had 
spoken out on this issue; he responded, “we deal with this with the Humanitarian 
Country Team. We are not so stupid as to do it alone”. However, group advocacy 
seemed to focus mostly on technical issues, such as a disaster law or relaxing 
customs requirements for imported relief goods. 
International strategy 4: Fishing for civil society actors with financial 
incentives  
As CSOs were reluctant to assist Muslim groups in Rakhine, one large INGO reported 
negotiating ‘overhead costs ’ with LNGOs. This approach tied funding to the condition 
of providing help to the most marginalised groups, although, it seems, never 
explicitly to minorities. An INGO staff member (#11, 10.01.2018) referred to extra 
“incentive” payments for LNGOs that would otherwise not have worked as their 
flood-response implementing partners in sensitive areas such as northern Rakhine. 
Later in the interview, however, this staff member denied using that term.  
 
These financial incentives did not always convince LNGOs. The director of a larger 
LNGO unaffil iated with any minority (#15, 24.01.2018) explained that his  
organisation only applied for this conditional funding if  the amount was large. 
Otherwise, “there is a common understanding of our focus: hardest hit, women, 
[the] elderly [and] children. Marginalised and discriminated groups [are] not a part 
of it. We do not even know who that is”. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
The findings for both States revealed minority marginalisation practices by the 
Myanmar Union government, with especially severe cases in Rakhine State. To 
support disaster victims of Chin ethnicity, parallel minority and diaspora networks 
were mobilised. Relief, which was not always distributed in a transparent or 
unbiased manner, was channelled from ethnically and religiously affi liated groups 
within and outside of Myanmar. Strong civil  society structures and ties between 
Christian LNGOs and INGOs also increased support, or at least attention, from the 
international humanitarian system. Navigating an aid system that is itself adjusting 
to the recent political and humanitarian developments in Myanmar, proactive Chin 
individuals carefully selected their lobbying strategies, targets and all ies. Some 
selectively foregrounded or backgrounded their ethnic identity depending on 
whether their interlocutor would be receptive to a more political minority discourse. 
 
For the most marginalised disaster victims in Rakhine State, however, the Muslim 
and especially the Rohingya minority identity led to a dead end rather than to parallel 
civil  society support channels. Civil  society and diaspora actors were unwill ing or 
unable to support Muslims, leaving the task to international humanitarians. Deeming 
it too risky to advocate openly, international humanitarian actors devoted significant 
effort to navigating the governmental barriers and the social and political tensions 
inherent in supporting highly stigmatised minorities. This included closely 
monitoring authorities ’ and different societal groups ’ perceptions of their 
organisations and activities and reaching out to Buddhist communities, religious 
institutions and governmental actors to increase acceptance. For many, ‘50/50’ 
became the new targeting standard, openly departing from the principle of 
impartiality for the sake of minimising tensions. Ultimately, in a context where 
perceptions and even strategic decisions such as targeting are manipulated, the 
humanitarians largely ended up being played by the government system, which 
wanted humanitarians to be seen as targeting only Muslims.  
 
This chapter has mostly examined the perceptions of Chin civil  society and 
international humanitarian actors. It has not dealt with the private sector (which is 
increasingly involved in providing and/or channelling resources following disasters in 
Myanmar), insurgent militarised actors, regional actors such as the Association of 
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Southeast Asian Nations, and policy makers at global humanitarian headquarters . A 
few Yangon-based I/NGOs, one of them criticised by other participants as involved 
in ‘outdated under the radar’ activities, did not react to my requests to meet. 
Additional research considering these actors ’ realities would likely uncover a larger 
variety of state interactions and navigation strategies, involving informal aid delivery 
and hidden diplomacy practices.  
 
Two major points can be drawn from the present findings. First, it is striking that a 
parallel system set up specifically to support marginalised groups —whether led by 
civil  society, as was the case for the Chin, or by international actors, as was seen for 
Muslims in Rakhine—can be considered the only viable short-term solution. In the 
long term, such parallel systems may increase feelings of exclusion and deepen the 
divide between antagonistic societal groups and between the Myanmar  government 
and the international community.  
 
Second, especially in the context of rising identity politics, humanitarian governance 
encompasses the governance of perceptions. Navigating the multiple and rapidly  
evolving LIC realities is difficult even within a single country, especially for aid 
organisations with country-wide mandates. As seen in the 2015 Komen respons e, 
satisfying the expectations of multiple audiences is close to impossible, leading to 
the question: should organisations risk compromising government authorisations, or 
community acceptance and associated security, or the principle of impartiality and, 
possibly, international funding? This conundrum makes one think of a Bermuda  
Triangle: between satisfying heterogeneous government, community and 
international audiences, something will  get lost. Trying to balance between 
governing differing perceptions and allocating aid resources according to 
humanitarian principles involves largely unavoidable trade-offs that must be 
carefully evaluated by practitioners and policy makers.  
 
Harvey (2013) states that, even in conflict settings where governments fail  to fulfil  
their responsibilities, humanitarians should engage governments at the policy, 
technical and practical levels through the framework of humanitarian principles, 
despite the dilemmas this involves. Although I agree with this point, it is not only a 
humanitarian agenda that “attempts to ring-fence an ever-shrinking isolationist 
humanitarian space” (Harvey 2013, S167) that can be problematic. Disaster 
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responders choosing to ‘water down’ the humanitarian space to safeguard good 
relations with the state or one community group risk becoming trapped in an 
increasingly restricted space, achieving little more than staying afloat. This can set 
precedents for state–humanitarian interaction and further tip the power balance in 
favour of the state. One tell ing example is that, by the time of the 2018 Rohingya 
crisis response in Myanmar, it had reportedly become “standard” for a key IO to 
dispatch their relief “without expats” and always accompanied by government 
officials (IO# 10, 30.01.2018). In authoritarian LIC settings, assessing in which cases 
confrontation might be needed remains a major challenge. Because high-level 
declarations are less adapted to these settings, negotiations at the operational level 
are key. 
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Chapter 6: Depoliticising Disaster Response in a Politically 
Saturated Context: The case of the 2016/2019 Droughts 
in Zimbabwe17 
 
Temporarily under embargo. 
  
                                                                 
17 This Chapter is a slightly revised, and extended, version of an article by Desportes and Moyo-Nyoni, under 
review by the journal Disasters.  
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Chapter 7: Disaster Governance in Conflict -affected 
Authoritarian Contexts: The cases of Ethiopia, Myanmar, 
and Zimbabwe18 
 
Temporarily under embargo. 
  
                                                                 
18 This chapter is an extended version, including additional sub-sections, of an article to be published 
within a Special Issue on the Politics of Disaster Governance in the journal Politics and Governance: 
Desportes and Hilhorst (2020). 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
Temporarily under embargo. 
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Annex 1: Semi-structured Interview Questions 
– adapted per case, context and participant 
 
IMPACT 
What was the impact of the disaster in your area 
Check as appropriate: cattle and human death, displacement/IDPs…  
WHY  Why did the disaster happen? 
ACTIVITIES What did you do in relation to disaster, where and when? 
DECISION TO 
RESPOND 
Why did you decide to act? 
Prompt: government declaration, own field observations… 
RESPONSE governance 
Which actors did you interact with more or less closely while planning and implementing the 
response (in community x)?Coax out details: why, how 
ORGANISATION/ 
COORDINATION 
- Engagement with s tate authorities? Degree of independence or 
rather control, uncertainty, manipulation? 
- Engagement with other humanitarian groups? Support, inspiration, 
common initiatives? 
- Engagement with donors? Support, l imitations? 
- Engagement with LNGOs? Why? Which role see for them? What 
were barriers in that engagement?  
- Engagement with community groups, beneficiaries/community 
members? Why? Which role see for them? Which were barriers in 
that engagement? 
Free space, own decision making? Concerning area selection, beneficiaries 
etc.? 
Prompt later: does gov control a  lot? Change in that the last years?  
Do you organise with other actors within forums or exchange in other 
forms? For which purposes, and is that useful? 
INFORMATION 
COLLECTION 
 Do you col lect your own information, needs assessments? 
What do you do with that information (ex. internal or public use)?  
Why do you need to collect information, i f the s tate provides information 
a lso? 
 
WHICH CHALLENGES DID YOU FACE IN THE RESPONSE 
Prompt the below categories  i f needed  
SOLUTION (cf. 
below, check 
here for 
coverage of 
a l l challenges) 
INFORMATION   
FUNDING   
TIMELINESS 
Early s igns / early warning / s tate of disaster 
declaration / response? 
 
BUREAUCRACY   
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ACCESS, SECURITY, 
POLITICAL 
SENSITIVITIES 
Do you have unhindered access to communities? 
Which impact does that have? 
 
ABOVE 
CONCERNING 
SPECIFIC TENSIONS 
(e.g. protests) 
  
OTHER 
CHALLENGES? 
  
OVERALL 
To what extent are these external ci rcumstances hindering you in your 
mandate? Are there factors which make your organisation different, 
which help you in overcoming? Would you say the humanitarian principles 
apply (independence, neutrality)? Are they useful, for instance in gaining 
access?  
OPPORTUNITIES  
Unforeseen or surprising opportunities for you 
 – ex. further mandate, engage in human rights i ssues..?  
Have others been trying to 
take advantage of the 
disaster s ituation? 
OVERCOMING 
CHALLENGES 
 
KEY ACTOR TO 
OVERCOME 
CHALLENGES 
Can you voice your concerns (reports/meetings)?  
Rely on somebody else to voice your concerns? Who?  
Who is more vocal/has more chances leading to change? With what 
effect? 
ROLE UN 
What i s their role?  
What should i t be? 
Do you see a different traction power between UN here and UN in New 
York/Geneva? 
 
ROLE GOV 
What i s their role?  
What should i t be? 
NGOs vs . INGOs 
How is  work distributed between them? Why l ike that? Where do you see 
the comparative advantage of NGO/INGO? What should their role be? 
ROLE OF 
COMMUNITY 
Did they play a  role, organize at community level?  
 
OTHER ACTORS? 
Donors?  
 
COMING TOWARDS THE END 
IDEAL SCENARIO 
What would be the ideal way to respond in this context? 
Ideally, what would you need to do your work? 
OTHER? Incl  other contacts, access to meetings 
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